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Abstract 
Belief change is a fundamental problem in AI: Agents constantly have to update their beliefs 
to accommodate new observations. In recent years, there has been much work on axiomatic 
characterizations of belief change. We claim that a better understanding of belief change can 
be gained from examining appropriate semanfic models. In this paper we propose a general 
framework in which to model belief change. We begin by defining belief in terms of knowledge 
and plausibility: an agent believes C$ if he knows that C$ is more plausible than -4. We then 
consider some properties defining the interaction between knowledge and plausibility, and show 
how these properties affect the properties of belief. In particular, we show that by assuming two 
of the most natural properties, belief becomes a KD45 operator. Finally, we add time to the 
picture. This gives us a framework in which we can talk about knowledge, plausibility (and hence 
belief), and time, which extends the framework of Halpem and Fagin for modeling knowledge 
in multi-agent systems. We then examine the problem of “minimal change”. This notion can be 
captured by using prior plausibilities, an analogue to prior probabilities, which can be updated 
by “conditioning”. We show by example that conditioning on a plausibility measure can capture 
many scenarios of interest. In a companion paper, we show how the two best-studied scenarios of 
belief change, belief revision and belief update, fit into our framework. @ 1997 Elsevier Science 
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1. Introduction 
In order to act in the world we must make assumptions, such as “the corridor is clear” 
or “my car is parked where I left it”. These assumptions, however, are defeasible. We can 
easily imagine situations where the corridor is blocked, or where the car is stolen. We 
call the logical consequences of such defeasible assumptions beliefs. As time passes, we 
constantly obtain new information that might cause us to make additional assumptions 
or withdraw some of our previous assumptions. The problem of belief change is to 
understand how beliefs should change. 
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and in artificial 
intelligence [ 27,381. In the literature, two instances of this general phenomenon have 
been studied in detail: Belief revision [ 1,271 attempts to describe how an agent should 
accommodate a new belief (possibly inconsistent with his other beliefs) about a static 
world. Belief update [ 381, on the other hand, attempts to describe how an agent should 
change his beliefs as a result of learning about a change in the world. Belief revision 
and belief update describe only two of the many ways in which beliefs can change. Our 
goal is to construct a framework to reason about belief change in general. This paper 
describes the details of that framework. In a companion paper [23] we consider the 
special cases of belief revision and update in more detail. 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to belief change is to simply represent an 
agent’s beliefs as a closed set of formulas in some language and then put constraints on 
how these beliefs can change. This is essentially the approach taken in [ 1,27,38]; as 
their results show, much can be done with this framework. The main problem with this 
approach is that it does not provide a good semantics for belief. As we hope to show in 
this paper and in [23], such a semantics can give us a much deeper understanding of 
how and why beliefs change. Moreover, this semantics provides the tools to deal with 
complicating factors such actions, external events, and multiple agents. 
One standard approach to giving semantics to beliefs is to put a preference ordering on 
the set of worlds that the agent considers possible. Intuitively, such an ordering captures 
the relative likelihood of worlds. Various authors [ 3,3 1,38,57] have then interpreted 
“the agent believes @’ as “4 is true in the most plausible worlds that the agent considers 
possible”. An alternative approach is to put a probability measure over the set of possible 
worlds. Then we can interpret “the agent believes @’ as “the probability of $ is close 
to 1” [ 501. We examine a new approach to modeling uncertainty based on plausibility 
measures, introduced in [20,24], where a plausibility measure just associates with an 
event (i.e., a set of possible worlds) its plausibility, an element in some partially ordered 
set. This approach is easily seen to generalize other approaches to modeling uncertainty, 
such as probability measures, belief functions, and preference orderings. We interpret 
the “agent believes 6’ as “the plausibility of e5 is greater than that of l@‘. As we show, 
this is often (but not always) equivalent to “$ is true in the most plausible worlds”. 
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By modeling beliefs in this way, there is an assumption that the plausibility mea- 
sure is part of the agent’s epistemic state. (This assumption is actually made explicitly 
in [ 3,411.) This implies that the plausibility measure is subjective, that is, it de- 
scribes the agent’s estimate of the plausibility of each event. But actually, an even 
stronger assumption is being made: namely, that the agent’s epistemic state is char- 
acterized by a single plausibility measure. We feel that this latter assumption makes 
the models less expressive than they ought to be. In particular, they cannot represent 
a situation where the agent is not sure about what is plausible, such as “Alice does 
not know that it typically does not rain in San Francisco in the summer”. To cap- 
ture this, we need to allow Alice to consider several plausibility measures possible; 
in some it typically does not rain and in others it typically does. * As we shall see, 
this extra expressive power is necessary to capture some interesting scenarios of belief 
change. 
To deal with this, in addition to plausibility measures, we add a standard accessibility 
relation to represent knowledge. Once we have knowledge in the picture, we define 
belief by saying that an agent believes C#I if she knows that C$ is typically true. That is, 
according to all the plausibility measures she considers possible, 4 is more plausible 
than -4. 
The properties of belief depend on how the plausibility measure interacts with the 
accessibility relation that defines knowledge. We study these interactions, keeping in 
mind that plausibility generalizes probability. In view of this, it is perhaps not sur- 
prising that many of the issues studied by Fagin and Halpern [ 141 when consider- 
ing the interaction of knowledge and probability also arise in our framework. There 
are, however, a number of new issues that arise in our framework due to the inter- 
action between knowledge and belief. As we shall see, if we take what are perhaps 
the most natural restrictions on this interaction, our notion of belief is characterized 
by the axioms of the modal logic KD45 (where an agent has complete introspective 
knowledge about her beliefs, but may have false beliefs). Moreover, the interaction 
between knowledge and belief satisfies the standard properties considered by Kraus 
and Lehmann [40]. Although our major goal is not an abstract study of the proper- 
ties of knowledge and belief, we view the fact that we have a concrete interpretation 
under which these properties can be studied to be an important side-benefit of our 
approach. 
Having a notion of belief is not enough in order to study belief change. We want a 
framework that captures the beliefs of the agent before and after the change, This is 
achieved by introducing time explicitly into the framework. The resulting framework is 
an extension of the framework of Halpern and Fagin [33] for modeling knowledge in 
multi-agent systems, and allows to talk about knowledge, plausibility (and hence belief), 
and time. This framework is analogous to combination of knowledge, probability and 
time studied in [ 351. AS we show by example, having knowledge, plausibility, and time 
represented explicitly gives us a powerful and expressive framework for capturing belief 
change. 
* In fact, this issue is discussed by Boutilier [ 3 1, although his framework does not allow him to represent 
such a situation. 
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This framework is particularly suited to studying how plausibility changes over time. 
One important intuition we would like to capture is that of minimal change. Suppose an 
agent gets new information at time t. Certainly we would expect his plausibility assess- 
ment (and his beliefs) at time t + 1 to incorporate this new information; otherwise, we 
would expect his assessment at time t + 1 to have changed minimally from his assess- 
ment at time t. In probabilistic reasoning, it can be argued that conditioning captures 
this intuition. Conditioning incorporates the new information by giving it probability 1. 
Moreover, the relative probability of all events consistent with the new information is 
the same before and after conditioning, so, in this sense, conditioning changes things 
minimally. We focus here on a plausibilistic analogue of conditioning and argue that it 
captures the intuition of minimal change in plausibilities. We can then proceed much in 
the spirit of the Bayesian approach, but starting with a prior plausibility and condition- 
ing, As we show, many situations previously studied in the literature, such as diagnostic 
reasoning [ 541, can be easily captured by using such prior plausibilities. Moreover, as 
we show in a companion paper [23], belief revision and belief update-which both 
attempt to capture intuitions involving minimal change in beliefs-can be captured in 
our framework by conditioning on an appropriate prior plausibility measure. Thinking 
in terms of priors also gives us insight into other representations of belief change, such 
as those of [5,31,43]. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
syntax and semantics of the standard approach to modeling knowledge using Kripke 
structures and show how plausibility can be added to the framework. Much of our 
technical discussion of axiomatizations and decision procedures is closely related to 
that of [ 141. In Section 3.1, we present our full framework which adds plausibility to 
the framework of [ 331 for modeling knowledge (and time) in multi-agent systems. In 
Section 4 we introduce prior plausibilities and show how they can be used. We conclude 
in Section 5 with some discussion of the general approach. Proofs of theorems are given 
in Appendix A. 
2. Knowledge and plausibility 
In this section, we briefly review the standard models for knowledge and beliefs (see 
[ 341 for further motivation and details), describe a notion of plausibility, and then show 
how to combine the two notions. Finally, we compare the derived notion of belief with 
previous work on the subject. 
2.1. The logic of knowledge 
We start by examining the standard models for knowledge and belief. The syntax 
for the logic of knowledge is simple: we start with primitive propositions and close off 
under conjunction, negation, and the modal operators Ki, . . , K,. A formula such as 
Ki@ is read “agent i knows 4”. The logic of belief is the result of replacing the Ki 
operator by Bi. The formula, Biq5 is read “agent i believes @‘. The resulting languages 
are denoted CK and LB, respectively. 
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The semantics for these languages is given by means of Kripke structures. A Kripke 
structure for knowledge (or belief) is a tuple (cl! r, Kt , . . , K,,), where W is a set 
of possible worlds, TT( w) is a truth assignment to the primitive propositions at world 
w E W, and the Lois are accessibility relations on the worlds in W. For convenience, we 
define Ici( w) = {w’ ) (w, w’) E Xi}. Intuitively, Ki( W) describes the set of worlds that 
agent i considers possible in w. We say that agent i knows (or believes) qb at world w, 
if all the worlds Ki(w) satisfy Cp. 
We assign truth values to formulas at each world in the structure. We write (M, w) t= 
q5 if the formula C$ is true at a world w in the Kripke structure M. 
(M, w) + p for a primitive proposition p if CT(W) (p) = true, 
(M,w) I==+ if (M,w) #h 
(M, w) h 4 A $ if (M, w) l= 4 and (M, w) F $, 
(M,w) b Ki# if (M,w’) /= C$ for all W’ E Xi(w). 
The last clause captures the intuition that 4 is known exactly when it is true in all 
possible worlds. When considering the language of beliefs LB, we typically use 13i 
rather than Ici to denote the accessibility relations. The truth condition for Bi4 is 
exactly the same as for Ky$. 
Let MK be the class of Kripke structures described above. We say that 4 E lK is 
valid in some M E MK if (M, w) b C#J for all w in M. We say that 4 E CK is valid in 
Mx if it is valid in all models M E MK. We say that 4 is satisfiable in MK if there 
is a model M E MK and world w such that (M, w) + 4. 
The definition of Kripke structure does not put any restriction on the Ici relations. 
By imposing conditions on the Ici relations we get additional properties of knowledge 
(or belief). These properties are captured by systems of axioms that describe the valid 
formulas in classes of structures that satisfy various constraints of interest. We briefly 
describe these systems and the corresponding constraints on the accessibility relations. 
Consider the following axioms and rules: 
Kl. All substitution instances of propositional tautologies 
K2. Ki+ A Ki( 4 * Q!J) * Ki$ 
K3. K;4 =+ 4 
K4. Ki4 + KiKi4 
KS. -Ki@ + Ki-Ki4 
K6. 7 Kifalse 
RKl. From 4 and 4 =+- I,!J infer fi 
RK2. From 4 infer Ki4 
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The system K contains the axioms Kl and K2 and the rules of inference RKl and 
RK2. By adding axioms K4 and K.5 we get system K45; if in addition we add axiom 
K6 we get system KD45; if instead we add axiom K3 to K45 we get the axiom system 
known as S5. 
We now relate these axiom systems with restrictions on the accessibility relations. 
We start with some definitions. A relation R on W is Euclidean if (x, y), (x, z) E R 
implies that (y, z ) E R, for all X, y and z in W; it is rejkive if (x, X) E R for all 
x E W; it is serial if for all x: E W there is a y such that (x, y) E R; and it is transitive 
if (x, y), (y, z) E R implies that (x, z) E R, for X, y and z in W. Let MeKf be the set 
of Kripke structures with Euclidean and transitive accessibility relations, Mzt be the 
subset of J4$ where the accessibility relations are also serial, and MEt be the subset 
of ME where the accessibility relations are also transitive. 
Theorem 1 (Halpern and Moses [ 341) . The axiom sysrem K (respectively K45, 
KD45, S5) is a sound and complete axiomatization of LCK with respect to MK (respec- 
tively M”,t, Mrt, Mgt). 
In this paper, we use the multi-agent systems formalism of [ 151 to model knowledge; 
this means that knowledge satisfies the axioms of S5. (We provide some motivation for 
this choice below; see i 151 for further discussion.) 
This implies that if an agent knows 4, then C$ is true (K3) and that the agent is 
introspective-he knows what he knows and does not know (K4 and K5). Belief, on 
the other hand, is typically viewed as defeasible. Thus, it does not necessarily satisfy 
K3. It may satisfy a weaker property, such as K6, which says that the agent does not 
believe inconsistent formulas. Like knowledge, belief is taken to be introspective, as it 
satisfies K4 and K5. Thus, in the literature, belief has typically been take to satisfy K45 
or KD45; we do the same here. According to Theorem 1, this means that the notion 
of knowledge we use is characterized by Mzt while belief 
or MFt. 3 
is characterized by Mg 
2.2. Plausibility measures 
Most non-probabilistic approaches to belief change require (explicitly or implicitly) 
that the agent has some ordering over possible alternatives. For example, the agent 
might have a preference ordering over possible worlds [ 5,32,39] or an entrenchment 
ordering over formulas [28]. This ordering dictates how the agent’s beliefs change. For 
example, in [ 321, the new beliefs are characterized by the most preferred worlds that 
are consistent with the new observation, while in [28] beliefs are discarded according 
to their degree of entrenchment until it is consistent to add the new observation to the 
resulting set of beliefs. 
7 As is well known, a relation is reflexive, Euclidean and transitive if and only if it is an equivalence 
relation (i.e., reflexive, symmetric and transitive) Thus, M, en consists of these structures where the K;s are 
equivalence relations. 
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Keeping this insight in mind, we now describe plausibility measures [ 20,241, This 
is a notion for handling uncertainty that generalizes previous approaches, including 
various notions of preference ordering. We briefly review the relevant definitions and 
results here. 
Recall that a probability space is a tuple ( W, 3, Pr), where W is a set of worlds, F is 
an algebra of measurable subsets of W (that is, a set of subsets closed under union and 
complementation to which we assign probability), and Pr is a probability measure, that 
is, a function mapping each set in 3 to a number in [0, I] satisfying the well-known 
probability axioms (Pr( 8) = 0, Pr( W) = 1, and Pr( A U B) = Pr( A) + Pr( B), if A and 
B are disjoint). 
A plausibility space is a direct generalization of a probability space. We simply replace 
the probability measure Pr by a plausibility measure Pl, which, rather than mapping sets 
in 3 to numbers in [ 0, 11, maps them to elements in some arbitrary partially ordered 
set. We read PI(A) as “the plausibility of set A”. If Pl( A) < Pl( B), then B is at least 
as plausible as A. Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple S = (w 3, Pl), where W is a 
set of worlds, 7 is an algebra of subsets of W, and Pl maps sets in F to some domain 
D of plausibility values partially ordered by a relation 60 (so that <n is reflexive, 
transitive, and anti-symmetric). We assume that D is pointed: that is, it contains two 
special elements TD and ID such that i D,D d <o TD for all d E D; we further < 
assume that Pl( a) = Tn and Pl(@) =Io. As usual, we define the ordering <u by 
taking dl <o d2 if dl <o d2 and dl # d2. We omit the subscript D from &, <D, TD 
and ID whenever it is clear from context. 
Since we want a set to be at least as plausible as any of its subsets, we require: 
Al. If A 2 B, then PI(A) < PI(B). 
Some brief remarks on this definition: We have deliberately suppressed the domain 
D of plausibility values from the tuple S, since for the purposes of this paper, only the 
ordering induced by 6 on the subsets in F is relevant. The algebra F also does not 
play a significant role in this paper. Unless we say otherwise, we assume _Y= contains all 
subsets of interest and suppress mention of F, denoting a plausibility space as a pair 
(w,Pl). 
Clearly plausibility spaces generalize probability spaces. We now briefly discuss a 
few other notions of uncertainty that they generalize: 
l A belief function B on W is a function B : 2w + [0, l] satisfying certain ax- 
ioms [ 551. These axioms certainly imply property Al, so a belief function is a 
plausibility measure. 
l A fuzzy measure (or a Sugeno measure) f on Li [ 591 is a function f : 2O H 
[ 0, 11, that satisfies Al and some continuity constraints. A possibility measure 
[ 121 Poss is a fuzzy measure such that Poss( W) = 1, Poss( 0) = 0, and Poss( A) = 
~UP,,,(PO~~({W)). 
l An ordinal ranking (or K-ranking) on 0 (as defined by [ 311, based on ideas 
that go back to [ 571) is a function K : 2” + N*, where N* = W U {cm}, such 
that ~(0) = 0, ~(0) = co, and K(A) = min ,+,EA ( K( {w}) ) . Intuitively, an ordinal 
ranking assigns a degree of surprise to each subset of worlds in 0, where 0 means 
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unsurprising and higher numbers denote greater surprise. It is easy to see that if K 
is a ranking on 0, then (0, K) is a plausibility space, where x <N* y if and only 
if y 6 x under the usual ordering on the ordinals. 
l A preference ordering on W is a partial order 4 over W [41,56]. Intuitively, 
w 4 w’ holds if w is preferred to w’. Preference orders have been used to provide 
semantics for default (i.e., conditional) statements. In [24] we show how to map 
preference orders on 0 to plausibility measures on W in a way that preserves the 
ordering of events of the form {w} as well as the truth values of defaults. We 
review these results below. 
l A parametrized probability distribution (PPD) on W is a sequence {Pri ) i > 0) of 
probability measures over W. Such structures provide semantics for defaults in E- 
semantics [ 30,501. In [ 241 we show how to map PPDs into plausibility structures 
in a way that preserves the truth-values of conditionals (again, see discussion 
below). 
2.3. The logic qf conditionals 
Our goal is to describe the agent’s beliefs in terms of plausibility. To do this, we 
describe how to evaluate statements of the form BC#J given a plausibility space. In 
fact, we examine a richer logical language that also allows us to describe how the 
agent compares different alternatives. This is the logic of conditionals. Conditionals are 
statements of the form 4 + fi, read “given 4, fl is plausible” or “given 4, then by 
default fl”. The syntax of the logic of conditionals is simple: we start with primitive 
propositions and close off under conjunction, negation and the modal operator --+. The 
resulting language is denoted Cc. 
Many semantics have been proposed in the literature for conditionals. Most of them 
involve structures of the form ( W, X, r), where W is a set of possible worlds, z-(w) is 
a truth assignment to primitive propositions, and X is some “measure” on W such as a 
preference ordering, a K-ranking, or a possibility measure. We now describe some of the 
proposals in the literature, and then show how they can be viewed as using plausibility 
measures. Given a structure ( W, X, n-), let [[$n s W be the set of worlds satisfying q5. 
l A possibility structure is a tuple (W, Pass, v), where Poss is a possibility measure 
on W. It satisfies a conditional 4 + I+? if either Poss( [[41]) = 0 or Poss( [[@A $11) > 
Poss( [[4r\ -+I]) [ 131. That is, either 4 is impossible, in which case the conditional 
holds vacuously, or 4 A + is more possible than 4 A -+. 
l A K-structure is a tuple (lY K, T), where K is an ordinal ranking on W. It satisfies 
a conditional 4 + ti if either K( [[+]I) = mOrK([[$A$]]) <K([[+A+]]) [311. 
l A preferential structure is a tuple (w <, z-), where < is a partial order on W. The 
intuition [ 561 is that a preferential structure satisfies a conditional 4 4 Cc, if all the 
most preferred worlds (i.e., the minimal worlds according to 4) in [[+I] satisfy +!J. 
However, there may be no minimal worlds in [4]]. This can happen if [[I$]] contains 
an infinite descending sequence . . . + w2 4 WI. What do we do in these structures? 
There are a number of options: the first is to assume that, for each formula 4, there 
are minimal worlds in [[41; this is the assumption actually made in [41], where 
it is called the smoothness assumption. A yet more general definition-one that 
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works even if + is not smooth-is given in [ 4,451. Roughly speaking, 4 + $ is 
true if, from a certain point on, whenever $ is true, so is $. More formally, 
(W, 3, r) satisfies 4 --) $, if for every world WI E [[+]I, there is a world 
w2 such that (a) w2 5 WI (so that w:! is at least as normal as WI ), (b) 
w:! E [[d A $1, and (c) for all worlds wg 3 wz, we have wg E [[+ + (cl]] 
(so any world more normal than w2 that satisfies 4 also satisfies I++). 
It is easy to verify that this definition is equivalent to the earlier one if 4 is smooth. 
l A PPD structure is a tuple (W, {Pr; 1 i 3 0}, 7r), where {Pri} is PPD over W. 
Intuitively, it satisfies a conditional 4 -+ Ic, if the conditional probability JI given 4 
goes to 1 in the limit. Formally, e5 ---t 1+9 is satisfied if limi,m Pr;( [[(cl]] 1[$I]) = 1 
[ 301 (where Pri( WI1 I [[411> is taken to be 1 if Pri( [[+]I ) = 0). 
In [24] we use plausibility to provide semantics for conditionals and show that our 
definition generalizes the definition in the various approaches we just described. We 
briefly review the definitions and results here. 
A plausibility structure is a tuple PL = ( W Pl, n-), where Pl is a plausibility measure 
on W. Conditionals are evaluated according to a rule that is essentially that used in 
possibility structures: 
PLi=~-+rC,ifeitherPl([[$]])=IorPl([+A#]]) >Pl([[Q,r\+]]). 
Intuitively, d-t+ holds vacuously if 4 is impossible; otherwise, it holds if 4A@ is more 
plausible than 4A+. It is easy to see that this semantics for conditionals generalizes the 
semantics of conditionals in possibility structures and K-structures. The following result 
shows that it also generalizes the semantics of conditionals in preferential structures and 
PPD structures. 
Proposition 2 (Friedman and Halpern [24] ). 
(a) rf 4 is a preference ordering on W, then there is a plausibility measure Pl+ on 
Wsuch that (K+,T) k4-q ifandonlyi;f(W,Pl+,rr) bq6--+$. 
(b) If PP = {Pri} is a PPD on W then there is a plausibility measure Plpp such that 
(W{Ps},n) k4-Ic, ifandonbif(W;Plp~,~) +4+-t. 
We briefly describe the construction of Pl+ and Pl pp here, since we use them in the 
sequel. Given a preference order -+ on W, let DO be the domain of plausibility values 
consisting of one element d, for every element w E W. We define a partial order on DO 
using 4: d,, < d, if w 4 u. (Recall that w -X w’ denotes that w is preferred to w’.) We 
then take D to be the smallest set containing DO that is closed under least upper bounds 
(so that every set of elements in D has a least upper bound in 0). For a subset A of 
W, we can then define PI+(A) to be the least upper bound of {d, 1 w E A}. Since D is 
closed under least upper bounds, PI(A) is well defined. As shown in [24], this choice 
of Pl+ satisfies Proposition 2. 
The construction in the case of PPDs is even more straightforward. Given a PPD 
PP = {Pri} on W, we define Plpp as follows: 
Plpp (A) ,< Plpp (B) if and only if lim,,, Pri( B 1 A U B) = 1. 
A straightforward argument shows that this choice of Plpp satisfies Proposition 2. 
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These results show that our semantics for conditionals in plausibility structures gen- 
eralizes the various approaches examined in the literature. Does it capture our intuitions 
about conditionals? In the AI literature, there has been discussion of the right prop- 
erties of default statements (which are essentially conditionals). While there has been 
little consensus on what the “right” properties for defaults should be, there has been 
some consensus on a reasonable “core” of inference rules for default reasoning. This 
core, known as the KLM properties [41], consists of the following axiom and rules of 
inference: 
LLE. From 4 H 4’ and 4 + ti infer 4’ + (I, (left logical equivalence) 
RW. From $ + $’ and 4 + + infer 4 + @I’ (right weakening) 
REE 4 + 4 (reflexivity) 
OR. From 41 --+ Cc, and 42 --+ 4 infer 4, v 41~ + t,b 
CM- From 4 + $1 and 4 + ~92 infer 4 A 91 - @2 (cautious monotonicity) 
LLE states that the syntactic form of the antecedent is irrelevant. Thus, if 41 and 42 
are equivalent, we can deduce 42 - Cc, from 41 + $. RW describes a similar property 
of the consequent: If Ic, (logically) entails (CI’, then we can deduce 4- t,b’ from 4--+ t,b. 
This allows us to can combine default and logical reasoning. REF states that 4 is always 
a default conclusion of 4. AND states that we can combine two default conclusions: If 
we can conclude by default both $1 and $2 from 4, we can also conclude $1 A $2 from 
4. OR states that we are allowed to reason by cases: If the same default conclusion 
follows from each of two antecedents, then it also follows from their disjunction. CM 
states that if @I and #2 are two default conclusions of 4, then discovering that $1 holds 
when 4 holds (as would be expected, given the default) should not cause us to retract 
the default conclusion +z. 
Do conditionals in plausibility structures satisfy the KLM properties? In general, the 
answer is no. It is almost immediate from the definition that a probability measure Pr 
is also a plausibility measure. Notice that Pr( [[4 A $11) > Pr( [[4 A -$]]) if and only 
if Pr( [[$]I j [[4]]) > l/2. Expanding the semantics of conditionals, we get that 4 - t,b 
holds in Pr exactly if Pr( [[4]]) = 0 or Pr( [[(cl]] 1 [[4]]) > l/2. It is easy to see that this 
definition does not satisfy the AND rule: it is not in general the case that 4 - 91 and 
4 --+1,%2 together imply 4+ ($1 AI&), since Pr(Ai 1 B) > l/2 and Pr(A2 1 B) > l/2 
do not imply Pr(Ai n A2 1 B) > l/2. Since the AND rule is a fundamental feature of 
qualitative reasoning, we would like to restrict to plausibility structures where it holds. 
In [24] we show that the following condition is necessary and sufficient to guarantee 
that the And rule holds: 
A2. If A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, Pl( A U B) > Pl( C), and Pl( A U C) > 
PI(B), then PI(A) > Pl(B UC). 
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It turns out that conditionals in plausibility structures that satisfy A2 also satisfy 
LLE, RW, and CM. They also satisfy OR when one of the conditionals 41 + 1c, and 
42 -+ $ is satisfied non-vacuously (that is, in a plausibility measure PI such that either 
Pl( [[&I]) > I or Pl( [[&I]) > i). To satisfy OR in general we need another condition: 
A3. If PI(A) = PI(B) =I, then Pl(A U B) =1. 
A3 also has a nice axiomatic characterization. Let N4 be an abbreviation for -4 + 
false. (This operator is called the “outer modality” in 1451.) Expanding the definition 
of -+, we get that N+ holds at w if and only if Pl( [[+I) =_L. Thus, Nd holds if -4 is 
considered completely implausible. We can think of the N modality as the plausibilistic 
version of necessity. It is easy to show that A3 corresponds to an AND rule for N. It 
holds exactly if (Nq5 A N+) + N(r$ A $). 
A plausibility space ( W, Pl) is qualitative if it satisfies A2 and A3. A plausibility 
structure (w Pl, r) is qualitative if (u! Pl) is a qualitative plausibility space. In [ 241 
we show that, in a very general sense, qualitative plausibility structures capture default 
reasoning. More precisely, we show that the KLM properties are sound with respect to a 
class of plausibility structures if and only if the class consists of qualitative plausibility 
structures. We also show that a very weak condition is necessary and sufficient in order 
for the IUM properties to be complete axiomatization of the language of default entail- 
ment considered in [ 411. These results help explain why so many different approaches 
to giving semantics to conditionals are characterized by the KLM properties. In addition, 
as we shall see, it also shows that if we want belief to have some reasonable properties, 
then we need to restrict to qualitative plausibility measures. 
2.4. Combining knowledge and plausibility 
We now define a logic that combines knowledge and plausibility. Let ,!ZKC be the 
language obtained by starting with primitive propositions, and closing off under con- 
junction, negation, and the operators Ki and *i, i = 1,. . . , n. Note that we have a 
different conditional operator for each agent. We read $J +i Cc, as “according to agent 
i’s plausibility measure, 4 typically implies t,V’. 
A (Kripke) structure Cfor knowledge and plausibility) is a tuple ( W, Z-, ICI,. . , K,, 
P, , . . . , P,,,) where W, VT and Ki are just as in Kripke structures for knowledge, while Pj 
is a plausibility assignment, a function that assigns a plausibility space to agent i at each 
world. Intuitively, the structure l’i( w) = (ficw,i), Plt,V,i)) captures agent i’s plausibility 
measure in the world w. For now we allow fi(+,,i, to be an arbitrary subset of W. We 
discuss some possible restrictions on a (w,i) below. It is reasonable to ask at this point 
where the plausibility spaces Pi(w) are coming from, and why we need a different one 
for each agent at each world. The answer to this question depends very much on the 
intended application. We defer further discussion of this issue until later. 
We can now give semantics to formulas in CKC in Kripke structures for knowledge 
and plausibility. This is done in a recursive way using the rules specified above for CK 
and Cc. Statements of the form K;# are evaluated according to K;: 
(M,w) k K& if (M,w’) b q5 for all W’ E Ki(w). 
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Fig. I. A full adder. XI and X2 are XOR gates, Al and A2 are AND gates, and 01 is an OR gate. 
Statements of the form q4 -‘i $ are evaluated according to Pi. Let [[4]],,,i, = {w’ E 
W(,,i, / (M,w’) I= 4). 
CM, w> I= 4 +i G if either Pl(,,g ( [41],,,i, ) =I 
orPl(,“,i)(U~A~n,,,i,> >pl(,,i)([[~r\l~ll,,,j,). 
We now define beliefs. Recall that true +i q4 means that #J is more plausible than 
-4 according to agent’s i plausibility measure. We might say that in this case the agent 
believes 4. However, recall that the agent can have different plausibility assessments at 
different worlds. Thus, there can be a model M, and worlds w, w’ such that (w, w’) E Ici, 
but (M, w) + true +i q!~ while (M, w’) b -(true -+; 4). (In Example 5, we show 
why this extra expressive power is necessary.) That is, 4 is more plausible than 74 in 
one of the worlds the agent considers possible, but not in another. Since our intention 
is that the agent should not distinguish between accessible worlds, we would like the 
agent to have the same beliefs in all the worlds he considers possible. We say that an 
agent believes 4 if he knows that 4 is more plausible than -4 in all the worlds he 
considers possible. Thus, we define Bi4, read “agent i believes @‘, as an abbreviation 
for Ki (true -+i 4). 
2.5. Example: circuit diagnosis 
The following example illustrates some of the expressive power of this language. 
Although it only involves one agent and only one plausibility measure in any given 
structure, it can easily be extended to allow for many agents with different plausibility 
measures. 
The circuit diagnosis problem has been well studied in the literature (see [ 81 for an 
overview). Consider a circuit that contains IZ logical components cl,. . . , c, and k lines 
11, . . . , lk. As a concrete example, consider the circuit of Fig. 1. 4 The diagnosis task 
is to identify which components are faulty. The agent can set the values of input lines 
4 The “full adder” example is often used in the diagnosis literature. In our discussion here we loosely follow 
the examples of Reiter [541. 
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of the circuit and observe the output values. The agent then compares the actual output 
values to the expected output values and attempts to locate faulty components. 
We model this situation using the tools we presented in the previous sections. We 
start by describing the agent’s knowledge using a Kripke structure. We then construct 
two possible plausibility measures over worlds in this Kripke structures, and examine 
the resulting knowledge and belief. 
Knowledge. We model the agent’s knowledge about the circuit using the Kripke struc- 
ture Mzag = (Wdiag,ndiog,Kdiag). Each possible world w E Wdiog is composed of two 
parts: fauZt( w), thefailure set-that is, the set of faulty components in w, and vaZue( w), 
the value of all the lines in the circuit. We consider only worlds where the components 
that are not in the failure sets perform as expected. For example, in the circuit of Fig. 1, 
if the AND gate Ai is not faulty, then we require that 15 has value “high” if and only if 
both II and Z2 have the value “high”. Most accounts of diagnosis assume that there is a 
logical theory A that describes the properties of the device. To capture our intuition, it 
must be the case that w is a possible world in M if and only if fauZt( w) and vuZue( w) 
are together consistent with A. 
The most straightforward language for reasoning about faults is the following: let 
@diuR = GfauZ4( ci ) 7. . . ,fuulty( c,) , hi( 11) , . . . , hi( lk)} be the set of propositions, where 
each fuuZty(ci) denotes that component i is faulty and hi(Zi) denotes that line i in a 
“high” state. We then define the interpretation G?-;TTdjUR in the obvious way: 
‘rrdiug( W) cfaULQ( Ci) ) = trUe, if Ci E fUUh( W), 
~diagtW)(hi(li)) =tme, if (Ii, 1) E vaZue( W). 
Next, we need to define the agent’s knowledge. We define o, 5 value(w) to be the 
values of those lines the agent sets or observes. The agent knows which tests he has 
performed and the results he observed. Therefore, we have (w, w’) E Kdia, if o, = owj. 
For example, suppose the agent observes hi(Zi ) A hi(Z2) A hi(Zs) A hi(Z7) A hi(Zs). The 
agent then considers possible all worlds where the same observations hold. Since these 
observations are consistent with the correct behavior of the circuit, one of these worlds 
has an empty failure set. However, other worlds are possible. For example, it might be 
that the AND gate A2 is faulty. This would not affect the outputs in this case, since if 
A1 is non-faulty, then its output is “high”, and thus, 01’s output is “high” regardless of 
A2’s output. 
Now suppose that the agent observes hi(Zi) A +i(Z2) A hi( Zs) A hi(Z7) A -hi( Zs). 
These observations imply that the circuit is faulty. (If It and Zs are “high” and Z2 is 
“low”, then the correct values for 17 and Is should be “low” and “high”, respectively.) In 
this case there are several possible failure sets, including {Xi}, (X2, Ot}, and {X2, A2}. 
In general, there is more than one explanation for the observed faulty behavior. Thus, 
the agent can not know exactly which components are faulty, but he may have beliefs 
on that score. 
Plausibility. To model the agent’s beliefs, we need to decide on the plausibility measure 
the agent has at any world. We assume that only failure sets are relevant for determining 
a world’s plausibility. Thus, we start by constructing a plausibility measure over possible 
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failures of the circuit. We assume that failures of individual components are independent 
of one another. If we also assume that the likelihood of each component failing is the 
same, we can construct a preference ordering on failure set as follows: If fi and f2 are 
two failure sets, we say that fi is preferred to f2 if Ifi 1 < If21, that is, if fi consists 
of fewer faulty components than fi. This preference ordering induces a plausibility 
measure using the construction of Proposition 2. In this measure Pl( Fi ) < Pl( F2) if 
minfEF,(lfl) < minfEFz(lfl). 
We can construct the same plausibility measure based on probabilistic arguments using 
PPDs. Suppose that the probability of a single component failing is E. Since we have 
assumed that failures are independent, it follows that the probability of a failure set f is 
$I( 1 _,)(&I) , since there are IfI components that fail, and n- IfI components that do 
not fail. To model the behavior of small but unknown failure probability, we can consider 
the PPD (Pro, Pri , . . .) , where in Pr,7, the probability of a single failure is 1 /(m + 1). It 
is not hard to check that limn,_,oo Pr,,(Fz)/Pr,,(Fi) =0 if and only if Pl(F2) < Pl(Ft) 
in the plausibility measure described above. Interestingly, this plausibility measure is 
almost identical to the K-ranking in which K( {f}) = IfI. The only difference is that 
if If11 = If21, Pl({_f}) is incomparable to Pl( {fz}) in the plausibility measure we 
constructed, while they are equal according to the K-ranking. 
In some situations it might be unreasonable to assume that all components have 
equal failure probability. Thus, we might assume that for each component ci there is a 
probability ei of failure. If we assume independence, then given E = (~1,. . . , E,), the 
probability of a failure set f is flC,E_+i L’,,ef( 1 - ei). We can construct a PPD that 
captures the effect of the &is getting smaller, but at possibly different rates: Suppose g 
is a bijection from N” to N. If m = (ml,. . . , m,), let Pr,,(,, be the distribution where 
the probability of ci failing is l/( mi + l), for i = 1,. . . , n. In this case, we get that 
lim,,,- Pr,,,( f2)/ Pr,, (fi) = 0 if and only if f2 is a strict subset of fi, i.e., if fi 
contains all the components in j-2 and more. Since we do not assume any relations 
among the failure probabilities of different components, it is not possible to compare 
failure sets unless one is a subset of the other. Thus, we can define f -X f’ if f c f’. 
Using the construction of Proposition 2, we can again consider the plausibility measure 
Pl induced by 4. It is not hard to see that Pl(F,) < Pl(F2) if for every failure set 
f I E F, - F2 there is some f:! E Fz such that f2 -X fl . As our construction shows, this 
plausibility measure can be induced by either a preference ordering or a PPD; however, 
it cannot be captured by a K-ranking or a possibility measure, since the ordering on 
failure sets is partial. 
Beliefs. We now have the required components to examine the agent’s beliefs. Using 
the two plausibility measures we just described, we can construct two possible structures 
Mdia,s, I and Mdiag,2. In both structures we set a,,.l) = xdi,g( w) , and in both Mdiag,I 
and Mdjag,2 the plausibility measure is induced from a preference ordering on failures 
(using the construction of Proposition 2). In MdiaR.1, we take the plausibility measure to 
be such that Plc,,i)({w}) 3 PI (w,i,({+v’}) if and only if Ifault(w)I < Ifault(w’)I, and 
in M&R,2 so that Pl~,,i)({w}) b Pl (w,i) ({w’}) if and only if fault( w) 2 fuult( w’). It 
is easy to see that, in both structures, if there is a world w in which these observations 
occur and where fault( w) = 8, then the agent believes that the circuit is faultless. If the 
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agent detects an error, he believes that it is caused by one of the minimal explanations 
of his observations, where the notion of minimality differs in the two structures. We 
now make this statement more precise. Let f be a failure set. Let D,- be the formula that 
denotes that f is the failure set, so that (M, w) k Df if and only if fault( w) = f. The 
agent believes that f is a possible diagnosis (i.e., an explanation of his observations) 
if -TBITD~. The set of diagnoses the agent considers possible is Bel(M, w) = {f / 
(M, w) + ~I31 TD~}. We say that a failure set f is consistent with an observation o 
if it is possible to observe o when f occurs, i.e., if there is a world w in W such that 
fault(w) = f and ow = o. 5 
Proposition 3. 
(a) Be1 ( M~+J, w) contains all failure sets f that are consistent with oW such that 
there is no failure set f’ with If’1 < IfI which is consistent with oW. 
(b) Bel( Mdiag,2, w) contains all failure sets f that are consistent with o, such that 
there is no failure set f’ with f’ c f which is consistent with o,,,. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. 0 
Thus, both Be1 ( Mding, 1, w) and Be1 ( Mding,z, w) consist of minimal sets of failure sets 
consistent with ow, for different notions of minimality. In the case of Mdiag.1, “minimal- 
ity” means “of minimal cardinality”, while in the case of Mdiag,z, it means “minimal 
in terms of set containment”. This proposition shows that Mdiag.1 and M&g,2 capture 
standard assumptions made in model-based diagnosis; M&g,, captures the assumptions 
made in [ lo], while Mdiag.2 captures the assumptions made in [ 541. More concretely, 
in our example, if the agent observes hi(Zl) A lhi(Z2) A hi(l3) A hi(l7) A -hi(ls), then 
in Mdiag,i she would believe that XI is faulty, since {Xl} is the only diagnosis with 
cardinality one. On the other hand, in Mdiag.2 she would believe that one of the three 
minimal diagnoses occurred: {Xi}, (X2, Oi} or (X2, AZ}. 
2.6. Properties of knowledge and plausibility 
Kripke structures for knowledge and plausibility are quite similar to the Kripke struc- 
tures for knowledge and probability introduced by Fagin and Halpern [ 141. The only 
difference is that in Kripke structures for knowledge and probability, Pi(w) is a proba- 
bility space rather than a plausibility space. Fagin and Halpern explore various natural 
restrictions on the interactions between the probability spaces Pi(w) and the accessibility 
relations Ici. Here we investigate restrictions on the interaction between the plausibility 
spaces and the accessibility relations. Not surprisingly, some of these conditions are 
exact analogues to conditions investigated by Fagin and Halpern. 
Given our interest in the KLM properties, we will be interested in structures that 
satisfy the following condition: 
QUAL. ‘%‘ii( w) is qualitative for all worlds w and agents i. 
‘Note that if A is a theory that describes the properties of circuit, then a failure f is consistent with 
observation O, if and only if f and o are consistent according to A. 
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The same arguments that show that A2 gives us the AND rule also show that it gives 
us property K2 for beliefs. More precisely, we have the following result. 
Theorem 4. [f M sati$es QUAL, then for all worlds w in M, we have 
(a> 
(b) 
(cl 
Proof. 
In view of this result, we typically assume that QUAL holds whenever we want to 
reason about belief. 
The set fi(,,,i) consists of all worlds to which agent i assigns some degree of plausibil- 
ity in world w. We would not expect the agent to place a positive probability on worlds 
that he considers impossible. Similarly, he would not want to consider as plausible (even 
remotely) a world he knows to be impossible. This intuition leads us to the following 
condition, called CONS for consistency (following [ 141) : 
CONS. fi,,,.,;, C Ici( w) for all worlds w and all agents i. 6 
A consequence of assuming CONS is a stronger connection between knowledge and 
belief. Since CONS implies that the most plausible worlds are in Ici( W), it follows 
that if the agent knows 4 he also believes 4. (Indeed, as we shall see, this condition 
characterizes CONS.) 
In probability theory, the agent assigns probability 1 to the set of all worlds. Since 
1 > 0, this means the agent assigns non-zero probability to some sets of worlds. It is 
possible to have T = _L in plausibility spaces. If this happens, the agent considers all 
sets to be completely implausible. The following condition, called NORM for normality 
(following [4.5] ), says this does not happen: 
NORM. P( w, i) is normal, that is, Tcw,f) >icw,i), for all worlds w and all agents i. 
We can strengthen this condition somewhat to one that says that the agent never 
considers the real world implausible. This suggests the following condition: Plt,,i) ({w}) 
>i. Stating this condition, however, leads to a technical problem. Recall that Pl(+,,i, 
is defined over the set of measurable subsets of fi(,,i,. In general, however, singletons 
may not be measurable. Thus, we examine a slightly weaker condition which we call 
REF for re$exive (following [45] ): 
h We remark that CONS is inappropriate if we use -+ to model, not plausibility, but counterfactual conditions, 
as is done by Lewis 1451. If CONS holds, then it is easy to see that K,~!J j K;(l+ +; $) is valid, for ah @. 
That is. if agent i knows #, then he knows that in the most plausible worlds where -0 is true, (i, is vacuously 
true, because there are no plausible worlds where -4 is true. On the other hand, under the counterfactual 
reading, it makes perfect sense to say “I know the match is dry, but it is not the case that if it were wet, then 
it would light if it were struck:’ 
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REE For all worlds w and all agents i, 
l w E R(,,i), and 
l Plc,,i,(A) >I for all A E _Fcw,,) such that w E A. 
As we said in the Introduction, much of the previous work using conditionals assumed 
(implicitly or explicitly) that the agent considers only one plausibility measure possible. 
This amounts to assuming that the plausibility measure is a function of the agent’s 
epistemic state. This is captured by an assumption called SDP (following [ 141) for 
state determined plausibilities: 
SDF’. For all worlds w and w’ and all agents i, if (w, w’) E K; then Pi(W) = ‘/‘i( W’). 
It is easy to see that SDP implies that an agent knows his plausibility measure. In 
particular, as we shall see, with SDP we have that q5 +i (c, implies Ki(4 ti +). 
It is easy to verify that the structures described in the diagnosis example of Section 2.5 
satisfy CONS, REF, and SDP. As mentioned in the introduction, SDP is not appropriate 
in all situations; at times we may want to allow the agent to consider possible several 
plausibility measures. To capture this, we need to generalize SDP The following example 
might help motivate the formal definition. 
Example 5. This is a variation of the Liar’s Paradox. On a small Pacific island there 
are two tribes, the Rightfeet and the Leftfeet. The Rightfeet are known to usually tell 
the truth, while the Leftfeet are known to usually lie. Alice is a visitor to the island. She 
encounters a native, Bob, and discusses with him various aspects of life on the island. 
Now, Alice does not know to what tribe Bob belongs. Thus, she considers it possible 
both that Bob is a Rightfoot and that he is a Leftfoot. In the first case, she should 
believe what he tells her and in the second she should be skeptical. 
One possible way of capturing this situation is by partitioning the worlds Alice 
considers possible into two sets, according to Bob’s tribe. Let WR (respectively WL) be 
the set of worlds that Alice considers possible where Bob is a Rightfoot (respectively 
Leftfoot). As the discussion above suggests, Alice’s plausibility measure at the worlds 
of WR gives greater plausibility to worlds where Bob is telling the truth than to worlds 
where Bob is lying; the opposite situation holds at worlds of WL. In such a structure, 
the formula T&i,,l(tell(#) +A[iCp 14) A T&iceT(tf?l/(f$) +A/& 4) iS satisfiable, 
where telZ(q5) is the formula that holds when Bob tells Alice 4. On the other hand, in 
structures satisfying SDP, this formula is satisfiable only when tell(+) has plausibility 
I in all the worlds that Alice considers possible. 
While this example may seem contrived, in many situations it is possible to extract 
parameters such as Leftfoot and Rightfoot that determine which conditional statements 
are true. For example, when we introduce time into the picture (in Section 3.1)) these 
parameters might be the agent’s own actions in the future. Such a partition allows us 
to make statements such as “I do not know whether q5 is plausible or not, but I know 
that if I do a, then 4 is plausible”, where 4 is some statement about the future. If the 
agent does not know the value of these parameters, she will not necessarily know which 
conditionals are true at a given world (as was the case in the example above). 
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Example 5 motivates the condition called unifarmity. 
UNIF. For all worlds w and agents i, if w’ E fi(,,i, then ?i( w) = P~(w’).~ 
It is not hard to show that UNIF holds if and only if, for each agent i, we can partition 
the set of possible worlds in such a way that for each cell C in the partition, there is a 
plausibility space (Wc,Plc) such that WC C C and Pi(w) = (WC, Plc) for all worlds 
w E C. Moreover, if CONS also holds, then this partition refines the partition induced 
by the agent’s knowledge, i.e., if C is a cell in the partition and w is some world C, 
then C G Ici( w). It easily follows that SDP and CONS together imply UNIF. 
When we model uncertainty about the relative plausibility of different worlds this way 
it is reasonable to demand that the plausibility measure totally orders all events; i.e., it 
is a ranking. The RANK assumption is: 
RANK. For all worlds w and agents i, Pi(W) is a ranking, that is, for all sets 
A,B c W, either PI,(A) < PI,,(B) or PI,(B) < PI,(A), and Pl,(A U B) = 
max(Pl,(A),Pl,(B)). 
Note that K-rankings and possibility measures are two examples of rankings. Addi- 
tionally, rational preference orderings of [ 411 are essentially rankings in the sense that 
for each rational preference ordering we can construct a ranking that satisfies exactly 
the same conditional statements [ 17,241. 
While rankings are quite natural, they have often been rejected as being too inex- 
pressive [ 291. In a ranking there is a total order on events. The standard argument 
for partial orders is as follows: In general, an agent may not be able to determine the 
relative plausibility of a and b. If the plausibility measure is a ranking, the agent is 
forced to make this determination; with a partial order, he is not. This argument loses 
much of its force in our framework, once we combine knowledge and plausibility. As 
we said above, the agent’s ignorance can be modeled by allowing him to consider (at 
least) two rankings possible, one in which a is more plausible than b, and one in which 
b is more plausible that a. The agent then believes neither that a is more plausible than 
b nor that b is more plausible than a. 
2.7. Knowledge and belief 
How reasonable is the notion of belief we have defined? In this section, we compare 
it to other notions considered in the literature. 
Recall that LB be the language where the only modal operators are BI , . . , B,. Let 
LKB be the language where we have Kl, . . . , K, and B1, . , B, (but no +i operators). 
It is not hard to see (and will follow from our proofs below) that to get belief to satisfy 
even minimal such as K2, we need the AND rule to hold. Thus, in this section, we 
restrict attention to Kripke structures for knowledge and plausibility that satisfy QUAL. 
‘This condition is not the same as uniformity as defined in 1451; nther, it corresponds in the Lewis 
terminology to absoluteness. 
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We then want to investigate the impact of adding additional assumptions. Let M be 
the set of all Kripke structures for knowledge and plausibility that satisfy QUAL, and 
let MCoNS (respectively M CoNS,NoRM) be the structures satisfying QUAL and CONS 
(respectively QUAL, CONS and NORM). 
Work on belief and knowledge in the literature [ 34,37,44] has focused on the modal 
systems S5, KD4.5, K45, and K with semantics based on Kripke structures as described 
in Section 2.1. Before we examine the properties of belief in our approach, we relate 
our semantics of belief (in terms of plausibility) to the more standard Kripke approach, 
which presumes that belief is defined in terms of a binary relation Bi. Can we define a 
relation Bi in terms of Ici and Pi such that (M, W) b Bi&, if and only if (M, U) k 4 
for all u E E$( w)? We show that this is possible in some structures, but not in general. 
Let S = ( WPl) be a qualitative plausibility space. We say that A C W is a set of 
most plausible worlds if Pl (A) > Pi(x) (where ;;i is the complement of A, i.e., W - A) 
and for all B c A, Pl( B) 2’ PI(B). That is, A is a minimal set of worlds that is more 
plausible than its complement. It is easy to verify that if such a set exists, then it must 
be unique. To see this, suppose that A and A’ are both sets of most plausible worlds, We 
now show that Pl (A n A’) > Pl (A n A’). Since A and A’ are both most plausible sets of 
worlds, this will show that we must have A = A’. To see that Pl (A n A’) > Pl (A n A’), 
first note that A n A’, A - A’ and A are pairwise disjoint. Since A and A’ are most 
plausible sets of worlds, we have that Pl( (A f’ A’) L (A - A’) ) = Pl (A) > PI(A) and 
Pl((AnA’)uTi) >Pl((AnA’)U(A’-A)) =Pl(A’) >Pl(A’) >Pl(A-A’). We 
can apply A2 togetthatPl(AnA’) >Pl((A-A’)UA) =Pl(AnA’). 
In finite plausibility structures (that is, ones with only finitely many worlds), it is 
easy to see that there is always a (unique) set of most plausible worlds. In general, 
however, a set of most plausible worlds does not necessarily exist. For example, consider 
the space So = ( W Pl), where W = {wI 1 i 3 0} and PI is defined as follows: PI(A) = CQ 
if A contains an infinite number of worlds, and Pl( A) = ma_tiz,EA (i) otherwise. Suppose 
that Pl( A) > PI(A). ‘;i must be finite, for otherwise Pl( A) = m. Thus, A must be 
infinite. Suppose wi E A. It is easy to see that A -- {Wi} is infinite and A - {wi} is 
finite. Thus, Pl(A - {w;}) > Pl(A - {wi}). Th is s h ows that there does not exist a set 
of most plausible worlds in S. 
If there is no set of most plausible worlds, then we may not be able to find a 
relation Bi that characterizes agent i’s beliefs. For example, consider the structure M = 
( W, T, ICI, PI ), where W = {wi 1 i >, 0) is the set of worlds described in Se above; r 
assigns truth values to primitive propositions pt , ~2, . . . in such a way that 7~( wi) (P,~) = 
true if and only if j 2 i; ICI is the complete accessibility relation Ict = W x W; and 
PI (wi> is the space SO described above. It is not hard to verify that (M, we) + B, 4 if 
and only if [b4~11,,,,,~, is a finite set, i.e., there is an index i such that for all j 3 i, we 
have ( M, w,i) b 4. Thus, (M, we) 1 Blp,; for all j 3 0. Yet there are no worlds in the 
model that satisfy all the propositions p,i at once. Thus, there is no accessibility relation 
B1 that characterizes agent l’s beliefs in wo. 
On the other hand, we can show that if there is always a set of most plausible worlds, 
then we can characterize the agents’ beliefs by an accessibility relation. Let S = (W,Pl) 
be a plausibility space. Define MP( S) to be the set of most plausible worlds in S if it 
exists, and 8 if Pl( W) =_L. Otherwise MP (S) is not defined. 
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Proposition 6. Let M be a Kripke structure for knowledge and plausibility. If 
MP(P,( w’)) is dejined for all w’ E Xi(w), then (M, w) k B& if and only if 
(M, w”) + 4for all w” E Uw,EIC,CWj MP(Pi(w’>>. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. 0 
This proposition implies that, if most plausible sets of worlds always exist in M, 
then we can set Bi(w) = lJW,EX,(Wj MP( Pi( w’) ) and recover the usual Kripke-style 
semantics for belief. 
This discussion shows that our model of belief is more general than the classical 
Kripke-structure account of beliefs, since there are models where the agent’s beliefs 
are not determined by a set of accessible worlds. However, as we shall see, this does 
not lead to new properties of beliefs in C B. Roughly speaking, this is because we have 
a finite model property: a formula in C B is satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable 
in a finite model (see Theorem 13 below). It is easy to verify that in a finite model 
MP(Pi( w)) is always defined. We note, however, that this finite model property is no 
longer true when we consider the interaction of beliefs with other modalities, such as 
time, or when we examine the first-order case. In these situations, the two models of 
beliefs are not equivalent. Plausibility is strictly more expressive; see [ 251. 
We now examine the formal properties of belief and knowledge in structures of 
knowledge and plausibility. We start by restricting our attention to CB. As we show 
below, the modal system K precisely characterizes the valid formulas of LB in the class 
M. However, in the literature, belief has typically been taken to be characterized by 
the modal system K45 or KD45, not K. We get K45 by restricting to models that 
satisfy CONS, and KD45 by further restricting to models that satisfy NORM. Thus, the 
two requirements that are most natural, at least if we have a probabilistic intuition for 
plausibility, are already enough to make Bi a KD45 operator. 
Theorem 7. K (respectively K45, KD45) is a sound and complete axiomatization for 
CB with respect to M (respectively MCoNS, MCoNS,NoRM). 
Proof. See Appendix A.1. q 
We now consider knowledge and belief together. This combination has been investi- 
gated in the literature [40,58]. In particular, Kraus and Lehmann [ 401 define Kripke 
structures for knowledge and belief that have two accessibility relations, one character- 
izing the worlds that are knowledge-accessible and one characterizing worlds that are 
belief-accessible. Ki and Bi are defined, as usual, in terms of these relations. They argue 
that the two accessibility relations must be coherent in the sense that the agent knows 
what she believes and believes what she knows to be true. Kraus and Lehmann describe 
restrictions on the interaction between the two relations that force this coherence. They 
show that in the resulting structures, the interactions between knowledge and belief are 
characterized by the following axioms. 
KBl. Bi$ + KiBi@ 
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It turns out that KBl holds in M and KB2 is a consequence of CONS. To see this, 
recall that Bi4 E Ki( true ---) 4). Using positive introspection for knowledge (axiom 
K4), we derive that Bi4 =+ KiKi( true + 4). This is equivalent to axiom KBl. When 
M satisfies CONS, we have that fi,,,i, _ C Zi( w). If (M, W) k Ki4, then all worlds in 
Ic, (w) satisfy 4. This implies that there are no worlds satisfying -4 in R(,,*,i,, and thus 
B;4 must hold. Thus, KB2 must hold. 
We now state this formally. Let AXKB consist of the S5 axioms for the operators Ki, 
the K axioms for the operators Bi, together with KBI; let AXKB,CoNS consist of AXKB 
together with the K4 and K5 axioms for Bi and KB2; and let AXKB,CoNS,NoRM consist 
of AXKB,CoNS together with the K6 axiom for Bi. 
Theorem 8. AXKB (respectively AXKB,CoNS, AXKB*CoNS5NoRM) is a sound and com- 
plete axiomatization of CKB with respect to M (respectively MCoNS, MCoNS,NoRM). 
Proof. See Appendix A. 1. 0 
As an immediate corollary, we get that there is a close relationship between our 
framework and that of [ 401. Let KL be the logic of Kraus and Lehmann: 
Corollary 9. For any 4 E C KB, KL k 4 if and only if MCoNS,NoRM b 4. 
We now relate to three other notions of beliefs in the literature-those of Moses and 
Shoham [ 491, Voorbraak [ 581, and Lamarre and Shoham [ 431. 
Moses and Shoham [49] also view belief as being derived from knowledge. The 
intuition that they try to capture is that once the agent makes a defeasible assumption, 
the rest of his beliefs should follow from his knowledge. In this sense, Moses and 
Shoham can be viewed as focusing on the implications of an assumption and not on 
how it was obtained. We can understand their notion as saying that 4 is believed if it is 
known to be true in the most plausible worlds. But for them, plausibility is not defined 
by an ordering. Rather, it is defined in terms of a formula, which can be thought of 
as characterizing the most plausible worlds. More formally, for a fixed formula (Y, they 
define BP4 to be an abbreviation for Ki(a 3 4). 8 The following result relates our 
notion of belief to that of Moses and Shoham. 
Lemma 10. Let M be a propositional Kripke structure of knowledge and plausibility 
satisfying CONS and SDI? Suppose that w, i, and (Y are such that the most plausible 
worlds in P;(w) are exactly those worlds in Ki( w) that satisfy a, i.e., MP( Pi( w) ) = 
{w’ E K;(w) / (M, w’) k a}. Then for any formula 4 E fKB that includes only the 
modalities Ki and Bi, (M, w) k 4 if and only if (M, w) k 4*, where 4* is the result 
of recursively replacing each subformula of the form Bi# in 4 by Ki( Q + +V). 
Proof. See Appendix A. 1. 0 
s Shoham and Moses also examine two variants of this definition. These mainly deal with the cases where 
(Y is inconsistent with the agent’s knowledge. For simplicity, we assume here that (Y is consistent with the 
agent’s knowledge. 
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Voorbraak [ 581 distinguishes two notions of knowledge: objective knowledge and true 
justified belief. He then studies the interaction of both notions of knowledge with beliefs. 
The intuition we assign to knowledge is similar to Voorbraak’s intuition for objective 
knowledge. However, Voorbraak objects to the axiom Ki4 + B& and suggests Big + 
BiKi4. The difference lies in the interpretation of belief. Voorbraak’s notion of belief 
is stronger than ours. His view is that the agent cannot distinguish what he believes 
from what he knows (indeed, he believes that what he believes is the same as what 
he knows). Our notion of belief is weaker, in that we allow agents to be aware of the 
defeasibility of their beliefs. 
Lamarre and Shoham [43] investigate the notion of knowledge as justified true belief 
using a framework that is very similar to ours. They start with an explicit preference 
ordering over possible worlds, and then define B”c$ to read “given evidence LY, 4 holds 
in the most plausible cY-worlds”. Their formal account of B”4 is exactly LY +i 4 in our 
notation. Unlike us, they examine a notion of knowledge as “belief stable under incorpo- 
ration of correct facts”, which is rather different then our notion of objective knowledge. 
Thus, while the technical construction is similar, the resulting framework is substantially 
different. Lamarre and Shoham take plausibility to be the only primitive, and use it to 
determine both knowledge and belief. We take both knowledge and plausibility to be 
primitive, and use them to define belief. 
2.8. Axiomatizing the language of knowledge and plausibility 
Up to now, we have considered just the restricted language LKB. We now present 
sound and complete axiomatizations for the full language fKC. The technical details 
are much in the spirit of the axiomatizations presented in [ 141 for knowledge and 
probability. Our complete axiomatization for M consists of two “modules”: a complete 
axiomatization for knowledge (i.e., SS) and a complete axiomatization for conditionals. 
In the general case, there are no axioms connecting knowledge and plausibility. For each 
of the conditions we consider, we provide an axiom that characterizes it. The axioms 
characterizing NORM, REF, RANK, and UNIF are taken from [ 451 and [ 71 (see also 
[ 17,241) , while the axioms for CONS and SDP (and also UNIF) correspond directly 
to the axioms suggested in [ 141 for their probabilistic counterparts. We also provide 
complete characterizations of the complexity of the validity problem for all the logics 
considered, based on complexity results for knowledge [ 341 and for conditionals [ 211. 
The axiom system can be modularized into three components: propositional reason- 
ing, reasoning about knowledge, and reasoning about conditionals. The component for 
propositional reasoning consists of Kl and RKl (from Section 2.1); the component 
for reasoning about knowledge consists of K2-K5 and RK2 (from Section 2.1); the 
component for reasoning about conditionals consists of the standard axioms and rules 
for conditional logic Cl-C4, RCI, and RC2 described in [ 17,241 following [7,45]: 
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Rl. From 4 and 4 + $ infer + 
RCl. From 4 H 4’ infer ($ + @) =+ (@ -+ @) 
RC2. From @ + I@ infer (q!~ --f +) + (4 + $‘) 
Let AX consist of Kl-K5, Cl-C4, RKl, RK2, RCl, and RC2. 
Theorem 11. AX is a sound and complete axiomatization for CKC with respect to M. 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 0 
We now capture the conditions described above-CONS, NORM, REF, SDP, UNIF, 
and RANK-axiomatically. 
RANK, NORM, REF, and UNIF correspond the axioms C5-C8, respectively, from 
[ 17,241: 
CONS and SDP correspond to the following axioms, respectively; 
It is interesting to note that the axioms for CONS and UNIF are derived from the 
axioms defined in [ 141 by replacing w(4) = 1 (the probability of 4 is 1) by Ni4, 
which has a similar reading. We show that adding the appropriate axioms to AX gives 
a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic with respect to the class of structures 
satisfying the corresponding conditions. 
Theorem 12. Let A be a subset of {RANK, NORM, REF, UNIF, CONS, SDP} and let 
A be the corresponding subset of {C5,C6,C7,C8,C9,ClO}. Then AX U A is a sound 
and complete axiomatization with respect to the structures in M satisfying d 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. q 
We now consider the complexity of the validity problem. Our results are based on a 
combination of results for complexity of epistemic logics [34] and conditional logics 
[21]. Again, the technical details are much in the spirit of those in [ 141. 
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We start with few results that will be useful in our discussion of complexity. As is 
often the case in modal logics, we can prove a “small model property” for our logic: if 
a formula is satisfiable at all, it is satisfiable in a small model. Let Sub(4) be the set 
of subformulas in 4. It is easy to see that an upper bound on IS&( 4) 1 is the number 
of symbols in 4. 
Theorem 13. Let A be a subset of {CONS, NORM, REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK}. The 
formula 4 is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only if it is satisfiable 
in a Kripke structure with at most 21Suh(@)l worlds. 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. Cl 
This shows that if (p is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a model with at most 
exponential number of worlds. Such a “small model” result is useful when we consider 
upper bound on the complexity of checking satisfiable. Roughly speaking, if there is a 
small model, then we can construct this model in time, say, exponential in the size of 
the formula. However, there is one problem with the result we have just proved. This 
“small” number of worlds does not necessarily mean that we can compactly describe the 
Kripke structure. Recall that PI,,,, describes an ordering over subsets of a,,,i,. Thus, 
in the worst case, we need to describe an ordering on 21nc1V~811 sets of worlds. Thus, the 
representation of a structure might be exponential in the number of worlds. Fortunately, 
we can show that a satisfiable formula is satisfiable in a small model with a compact 
representation. 
We start with a definition. We say that M = (W,r,K:l,. . . ,Kn,Pl,. . . , P,,) is a 
preferential (Kripke) structure if for each Pi(w), there is a preference ordering <(w,i) 
on fi,,,i, that induces Pl,,,i, using the construction of Proposition 2. Recall that a 
preference ordering is a binary relation on the set of possible worlds. Thus, if W is 
finite, we can describe the relations Ici and the preference orderings <(w,i) using tables 
of size at most 1 W12. So the representation of such structures is polynomial in I WI. Is it 
possible to find a small preferential Kripke structure satisfying q5? Indeed we can. Using 
results of [ 211, we immediately get the following lemma: 
Lemma 14. Let A be a subset of {CONS, NORM,REF, SDP, UNIF, RANK}. rf a 
formula 4 is sati@able in a Kripke structure satisfying A with N worlds, then q5 is 
satisfiable in a preferential Kripke structure with at most ISub( 4) IN worlds. 
Combining this with Theorem 13, we conclude that if 4 is satisfiable, then it is 
satisfiable in a structure of exponential size with an exponential description. It can be 
shown that this result is essentially optimal (see [ 21,341) . However, if there is only one 
agent and we assume CONS and either UNIF or SDP, then we can get polynomial-sized 
models. 
Theorem 15. Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM, REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK} con- 
taining CONS and either SDP or UNIF. If q!~ talks about the knowledge and plausibility 
of only one agent, then 4 is satisjable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only 
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if it is satisfiable in a preferential Kripke structure satisfying A with at most ISub( 4) I3 
worlds. 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 0 
We now consider the complexity of decision procedure for the validity problem. The 
difficulty of deciding whether 4 is valid is a function of the length of 4, written 141. 
Theorem 16. Let d be a subset of {CONS, NORM,REF, SDP, UNIF,RANK}. IJ 
CONS E A, but it is not the case that UNIF or SDP is in A, then the validity problem 
with respect to structures satisfying A is complete for exponential time. Otherwise, the 
validity problem is complete for polynomial space. 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 0 
If we restrict attention to the case of one agent and structures satisfying CONS and 
either UNIF or SDP, then we can do better. 
Theorem 17. Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF,SDP,UNIF,RANK} con- 
taining CONS and either UNIF or SDP. For the case of one agent, the validity problem 
in models satisfying A is co-NP-complete. 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 0 
3. Adding time 
In the previous section, we developed a model of knowledge and beliefs. Having 
a good mode1 of knowledge and belief is not enough in order to study how beliefs 
change. Indeed, if we are mainly interested in agents’ beliefs, the additional structure 
of plausibility spaces does not play a significant role in a static setting. However, if we 
introduce an explicit notion of time, we expect the plausibility measure to (partially) 
determine how agents change their beliefs. As we shall see, this gives a reasonable 
notion of belief change. 
In this section, we introduce time into the framework. We then examine how time, 
knowledge, and plausibility interact. In particular, we suggest a notion of conditioning 
that captures the intuition that plausibility changes in the minimal way that is required 
by changes to the agent’s knowledge. 
3.1. Knowledge and plausibility in multi-agent systems 
A straightforward approach to adding time is by introducing another accessibility 
relation on worlds, which characterizes their temporal relationship (see, for example, 
[ 401). We introduce more structure into the description by adopting the framework of 
Halpern and Fagin [ 331 for modeling multi-agent systems. This structure gives a natural 
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definition of knowledge and an intuitive way to describe agents’ interactions with their 
environment. We start by describing the framework of Halpern and Fagin, and then add 
plausibility. 
The key assumption in this framework is that we can characterize the system by 
describing it in terms of a state that changes over time. This is a powerful and nat- 
ural way to model systems. Formally, we assume that at each point in time, each 
agent is in some local state. Intuitively, this local state encodes the information that 
is available to the agent at that time. In addition, there is an environment, whose state 
encodes relevant aspects of the system that are not part of the agents’ local states. 
For example, if we are modeling a robot that navigates in some office building, we 
might encode the robot’s sensor input as part of the robot’s local state. If the robot 
is uncertain about his position, we would encode this position in the environment 
state. 
A global state is a tuple (s,, sr , . . . , s,,) consisting of the environment state se and the 
local state Si of each agent i. A run of the system is a function from time (which, for 
ease of exposition, we assume ranges over the natural numbers) to global states. Thus, 
if r is a run, then r(O),r(l),... is a sequence of global states that, roughly speaking, 
is a complete description of what happens over time in one possible execution of the 
system. We take a system to consist of a set of runs. Intuitively, these runs describe all 
the possible sequences of events that could occur in a system. 
Given a system R, we refer to a pair (r, m) consisting of a run r E R and a time 
m as a point. If r(m) = (s,,s~,...,s,), we define ri(m> = si; thus, ri(m) is agent 
i’s local state at the point (r, m). Finally, to reason in a logical language about such a 
system, we need to assign truth values to primitive propositions. An interpreted system 
is a tuple (73, n-) consisting of a system R together with a mapping r that associates 
a truth assignment with the primitive propositions at each state of the system. 
An interpreted plausibility system can be viewed as a Kripke structure for knowledge. 
We say two points (r, m) and (r’, m’) are indistinguishable to agent i, and write 
(r, m) Ni (r’, m’), if ri( m) = ri( m’), i.e., if the agent has the same local state at both 
points. This is consistent with the intuition that an agent’s local state encodes all the 
information available to the agent. Taking -; to define the K; relation, we get a Kripke 
structure over points. 9 
This definition of knowledge has proved useful in many applications in distributed 
systems and AI (see [ 151 and the references therein). As argued above, we want to add 
the notion of plausibility so that we can model the agent’s beliefs. It is straightforward 
to do so by adding a plausibility assessment for each agent at each point. Formally, an 
interpreted plausibility system is a tuple Z = (R, rr, PI , . . , P,,), where R and r are as 
before, and the plausibility assignment Pi maps each point (r, m) to a plausibility space 
Pi(r,m) = (n(,,,,,i),Pl(,,,,,i)). 
In order to reason about the temporal aspects of the system, we add to the language 
temporal modalities in the standard fashion (see [ 261). These include 04 for “4 is 
true at the next time step” We call this language C KcT Evaluation of temporal modalities . 
‘) It is straightforward to extend these definitions to deal with continuous time. This is done, for example, 
in 161. 
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at a point (r, m) is done by examining the future points on the run r: Given a point 
(r, m) in an interpreted system 2, we have that 
This framework is clearly a temporal extension of the logic of knowledge and plausibility 
described in the previous section. 
3.2. Example: Circuit diagnosis revisited 
We now show how the framework can be used to extend the example of Section 2.5 
to incorporate time, allowing the agent to perform a sequence of tests. 
We want to model the process of diagnosis. That is, we want to model the agent’s 
beliefs about the circuit while it performs a sequence of tests, and how the observations 
at each step affects her beliefs. Thus, we want to model the agent and the circuit 
as part of a system. To do so, we need to describe the agent’s local state and the 
state of the environment. The construction we used in Section 2.5 provides a natural 
division between the two: The agent’s state is the sequence of input-output relations 
observed, while the environment’s state describes the faulty components of the circuit 
and the values of all the lines. This corresponds to our intuitions, since the agent can 
observe only the input-output relations. Each run describes the results of a specific 
series of tests the agent performs and the results he observes. We make two additional 
assumptions: 
( I ) the agent does not forget what tests were performed and their results, and 
(2) the faults are persistent and do not change over time. 
Formally, we define the agent’s state r-1 (m) to be (o~,,o), . . . , Ok,,,,)), where o(,,,,,) de- 
scribes the input-output relation observed at time m. We define the environment state 
r,(m) = &zult( r, m) , vulue( r, m) ) to be the failure set at (r) and the values of all the 
lines. We capture the assumption that faults do not change by requiring thatfault( r, m) = 
fault( r, 0). The system Rdiafi consists of all runs r satisfying these requirements in which 
value( r, m) is consistent withfault( r, m) and o(~,~,) for all m. 
Given the system Rdiag, we can define two interpreted plausibility systems corre- 
sponding to the two plausibility measures we considered in Section 2.5. In both systems, 
fi~,,~,,~) =G(r,m). InZhg,13 we compare two points (r-1 ,m) and (r2, m) by comparing 
the size of fuult( r1, m) and fault( r-2, m), while in &iag,2 we check whether one failure 
set is a subset of the other. At a point (r, m), the agent considers possible all the points 
where he performed the same tests up to time m and observed the same results. As 
before, the agent believes that the failure set is one of the minimal explanations of his 
observations. As the agent performs more tests, his knowledge increases and his beliefs 
might change. 
We define Bel(Z, r, m) to be the set of failure sets (i.e., diagnoses) that the agent 
considers possible at (r, m). Belief change in Zd;clR,l is characterized by the following 
proposition. 
‘(’ It is easy to add other temporal modalities such as until, eventually, since, etc. These do not play a role in 
this work. 
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Proposition 18. If there is some f E Bel( Zdias,l, r,m) that is consistent with the 
new observation o( r,n,+ 11, then Bel(Zdi,,t, r, m + 1) consists of all the failure sets in 
Bel(&iaR,t, Y, m) that are consistent with o(,,,,,+I). if alf f E B(&&rJ, r, m) are incon- 
sistent with o(,,,,+ I), then B(Zd;aS,l, r, m + 1 ) consists of all failure sets of cardinality 
j that are consistent with o(,,,,+I), where j is the least cardinal@ for which there is at 
least one failure set consistent with o(,,,,+I 1. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. q 
Thus, in Idiag,t, a new observation consistent with the current set of most likely 
explanations reduces this set (to those consistent with the new observation). On the 
other hand, a surprising observation (one inconsistent with the current set of most likely 
explanations) has a rather drastic effect. It easily follows from Proposition 18 that if 
o(,,,+t) is surprising, then Bel(&ias,r, r,m) CI Bel(&+,,!, r, m f 1) = 0, so the agent 
discards all his current explanations in this case. Moreover, an easy induction on m shows 
that if Bel(&ias,l, r, m) nBel(Z&s,t , r, m + 1) = 0, then the cardinality of the failure sets 
in Bel(Zd;,s,t , r, m + 1) is greater than the cardinality of failure Sets in Bel(&iaR,t, r, m). 
Thus, in this case, the explanations in Bel(&iabt , r, m + 1) are more complicated than 
those in B(Zdiag,, r, m). Notice that if we can characterize the observation o(,,,,,+r) in 
our language-that is, if we have a formula C$ such (I, r’,m’) k (b if and only if 
o(,.~,,,,~) = o(,,,,+t)---then we can also express the fact that agent i considers it surprising: 
This is true precisely if (z&g,t , r, m) k BilO 4. 
Belief change in zdias,* is quite different, as the following proposition shows. Given a 
failure set f, we define ext(f) = {f’ / f C f’}. Th us, ext( f) consists of all the failure 
sets that extend f. 
Proposition 19. Be1 (&iag,2, r, m + 1) consists of the minimal (according to C) failure 
SetS in &W<,,,,,,s ,r,nl) ext( f) that are consistent with o(~,,~,+I). 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. 0 
We see that, as with &;=g,t, failure sets that are consistent with the new observation 
are retained. However, unlike zdiag,t, failure sets that are discarded are replaced by 
more complicated failure sets even if some of the explanations considered most likely 
at (r,m) are consistent with the new observation. Moreover, while new failure sets in 
Be1 (~di~g,t, r m + 1) can be unrelated to failure sets in Bel(&i,s,t , r, m), in Zdiag,2 the 
new failure sets must be extensions of some discarded failure sets. Thus, in Zdiug,t the 
agent does not consider new failure sets as long as the observation is not surprising. On 
the other hand, in zdia,rJ the agent has to examine new candidates after each test. The 
latter behavior is essentially that described by Reiter [ 54, Section 51. 
3.3. Axiomatizing the language of knowledge, plausibility and time 
We now present sound and complete axiomatization for the language CKcr. The 
technical details are much in the spirit of the results of Section 2.8, with two exceptions. 
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First, we need to deal also with the temporal modality 0. Second, instead of dealing 
with worlds, we are dealing with systems that have some structure, i.e., the distinction 
between agents’ local state and the environment’s state. As we shall see, both issues can 
be dealt with in a straightforward manner. 
The axiom system AXr consists of the axioms and rule in the axiom system AX of 
Section 2.8 and the following axioms and rule the describe the properties of 0: 
RTl. From 4 infer 04. 
Let C be the set of all plausibility interpreted systems. 
Theorem 20. The axiom system AXT is a sound and complete axiomatization of CKcr 
with respect to C. 
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 0 
We can also prove a result analogous to Theorem 12 that describes a complete ax- 
iomatization for the classes of systems satisfying some of the assumptions we examined 
in Section 2.4. 
Theorem 21. Let A be a subset of {RANK, NORM, REF, UNIF, CONS, SDP} and let 
A be the corresponding subset of {C5,C6,C7,C8,C9,ClO}. Then AXT U A is a sound 
and complete axiomatization with respect to systems in C satisfying d 
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 0 
4. Prior plausibilities 
The formal framework of knowledge, plausibility and time described in the previous 
section raises a serious problem: While it is easy to see where the wi relations that define 
knowledge come from, the same cannot be said for the plausibility spaces Pi( I, m) . We 
now present one possible answer to this question, inspired by probability theory. 
Up to now, we have allowed the plausibility assessment at each point to be al- 
most arbitrary. In particular, the plausibility space Pi( Y, m) can be quite different from 
‘Pi ( r, m + 1) . Typically, we would expect there to be some relationship between these 
successive plausibility assessments. For example, it seems reasonable to expect that the 
new plausibility assessment should incorporate whatever was learned at (r, m + 1)) but 
otherwise involve minimal changes from ‘Pi( r, m) . 
One way of doing this in probability theory is by conditioning. If we start with a 
probability function Pr and observe E, where Pr( E) > 0, then the conditional probability 
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function PrE is defined so that PrE(A> = Pr(AnE)/Pr(E). Typically PrE(A) is denoted 
Pr( A 1 E). Notice that PrE incorporates the new information E by giving it probability I. 
It also is a minimal change from Pr in the sense that if A, B C E, then Pr( A)/ Pr( B) = 
Pr( A 1 E) / Pr( B ) E): the relative probability of events consistent with E is not changed 
by conditioning. ’ ’ 
Conditioning is a standard technique in probability theory, and can be justified in a 
number of ways, one of which is the notion of “minimal change” we have just described. 
Another justification is a “Dutch book” argument [ 9,531, which shows that if an agent 
uses some other method of updating probabilities, then it is possible to construct a 
betting game in which he will always lose. Probability measures are particular instances 
of plausibility measures. Can we generalize the notion of conditioning to plausibility 
measures? 
It immediately follows from the definitions that the ordering of the likelihood of 
events induced by PrE is determined by the ordering induced by Pr: 
Pr(A 1 E) < Pr(B 1 E) if and only if Pr(A c7 E) 6 Pr(B n E). 
We want the analogous property for plausibility: 
COND. PI(AIC) < Pl(BIC) if and only if Pl(A n C) < Pl(B n C) 
This rule determines the order induced by posterior plausibilities. Since we are in- 
terested only in this aspect of plausibility, any method of conditioning that satisfies 
COND will do for our present purposes. (See [20] for an examination of other prop- 
erties we might require of conditioning.) Notice that any two methods for conditioning 
are isomorphic in the following sense: Let St = (WI, PI, ) and S2 = (Wz, Pl2) be two 
plausibility spaces. We say that St and Sz are (order) isomorphic if there is a bijection 
h from WI to W2 such that, for A, B c WI, we have Pit (A) < Pit (B) if and only if 
Plz (h(A) ) 6 Plz (h( B) ) Any two definitions of conditioning that satisfy COND result 
in order-isomorphic plausibility spaces (see [ 201) . 
This discussion suggests that we define PI (r,n,+t,i) to be the result of conditioning 
Pl(,,Jl,.,) on the new knowledge gained by agent i at (r, m + I ). This, however, leads to 
the following technical problem. If the agent gains new knowledge at (r, m + I), then 
ri( m) # r;( m + 1). This implies that the sets of points the agent considers possible 
are disjoint, i.e., Ki( r, m) n Ki(r, m + 1) = 8. But then CONS implies that Pl(.,,,,,i) and 
Plcr,rtr+t ,i) are defined over disjoint spaces, so we cannot apply COND. 
We circumvent this difficulty by working at the level of runs. The approach we 
propose resembles the Bayesian approach to probabilities. Bayesians assume that agents 
start with priors on all possible events. If we were thinking probabilistically, we could 
imagine the agents in a multi-agent system starting with priors on the runs in the 
system. Since a run describes a complete history over time, this means that the agents 
” There is another sense in which PTE represents the minimal change from Pr. If we measure the “distance” 
of a probability distribution Pr’ from Pr in terms of the cross-entropy of Pr’ relative to Pr, then it is well 
known that PrE is the distribution that minimizes the relative cross-entropy from Pr among all distributions 
Pr’ such that Pr’( E) = 1 1421. Indeed, this holds true for other distance measures as well [ 1 I 1. 
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Fig. 2. Schematic description of how the agent’s knowledge evolves in time in synchronous systems with 
perfect recall. The boxes represent the set of points in Ki( r, m). Since the system is synchronous, at each 
time point, the agent consider possible points at the same time. Since the agent has perfect recall, as time 
progresses, the agent considers smaller and smaller sets of runs possible. The ovals represent two disjoint 
events that correspond to the same set of runs. 
are putting a prior probability on the sequences of events that could happen. We would 
then expect the agent to modify his prior by conditioning on whatever information he 
has learned. This is essentially the approach taken in [35] to defining how the agents’ 
probability distribution changes in a multi-agent system. We can do the analogous thing 
with plausibility. 
We start by making the simplifying assumption that we are dealing with synchronous 
systems where agents have perfect recall [36]. Intuitively, this means that the agents 
know what the time is and do not forget the observations they have made. Formally, a 
system is synchronous if for any i, (r,m) Ni (r’, m’) only if m = m’. Notice that by 
restricting to synchronous systems, if we further assume that the plausibility measure 
P;(r,m) satisfies CONS, we never have to compare the plausibilities of two different 
points on the same run. In synchronous systems, agent i has perfect recall if (r’, m+l ) Ni 
(r,m+ 1) implies (r’,m) Ni (r, m). Thus, agent i considers run r possible at the point 
(r, m + 1) only if he also considers it possible at (r, m). This means that any runs 
considered impossible at (r, m) are also considered impossible at (r, m + 1) ; an agent 
does not forget what he knew. 
Just as with probability, we assume that an agent has a prior plausibility measure 
on runs, that describes his prior assessment on the possible executions of the system. 
As the agent gains knowledge, he updates his prior by conditioning. More precisely, 
at each point (r, m), the agent conditions his previous assessment on the set of runs 
considered possible at (r, m). This is process is shown in Fig. 2. This results in an 
updated assessment (posterior) of the plausibility of runs. This posterior induces, via a 
projection from runs to points, a plausibility measure on points. We can think of agent 
i’s posterior at time m as simply his prior conditioned on his knowledge at time m. 
TO make this precise, let S = ( W, PI) be a plausibility space. Define the projection of S 
on E as SIE = (WIE,P~ 1~). where WIE = WnE and Pl 1~ is the restriction of Pl to WIE. 
Projection is similar to conditioning: for any definition of conditioning that satisfies 
COND if A,B C E, then Pl(AIE) < Pl(BIE) if and only if PIIE(A) 6 PIIE(B). 
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Fig. 3. Schematic description of the entities involved in the definition of priors. Note some are defined over 
mns and some over points. 
Indeed, S(E is essentially isomorphic to any conditional plausibility measure that results 
from conditioning on E. ‘* 
We can now define what it means for a plausibility measure on points to be generated 
by a prior. Suppose that agent i’s prior plausibility at run Y is Pc~,~J = (R(,i), Pl(,i,), 
where R~,,J C_ 72. Our intuition is that the agent conditions the prior by his knowledge 
at time (r, m). In our framework, the agent’s knowledge at time m is the set of point 
K,( r, m). We need to convert this set of points to an event in terms of runs. If A is a 
set of points, we define R(A) = {r 1 3m( ( r,m) E A)} to be the set of runs on which 
the points in A lie. Using this notation, the set of runs agent i considers possible at 
(r, m) is simply R(ICi( r, m) ). Thus, after conditioning on this set of runs, we get agent 
i’s posterior at (Y, m), which is simply the projection of the prior on the observation: 
Pl(,,i) IR(K,(r,m)). We now use this plausibility measure, which is a measure on a set of 
runs, to define Pj( Y, m), which is a measure on a set of points. We do so in the most 
straightforward way: we project each run to a point that lies on it. Formally, we say that 
I2 To make this precise, we need a notion that is slightly more general than isomorphism. Let P = (U: Pr) 
be a probability space. A set A is called a support of P if Pr(x) = 0. We can define a similar notion for 
plausibility spaces, Let S = (W, PI) be a plausibility space. We say that A C W is a support of S, if for 
all B s W, Pl( B) = Pl( B n A). Thus, only B n A is relevant for determining the plausibility of B. This 
certainly implies that PI(x) = I, since we must have PI(x) = Pl( A n 2) = Pl( 0), but the converse does 
not hold in general. In probability spaces, Pr(x) = 0 implies that Pr( B) = Pr(B n A) for all B, but the 
analogous condition does not hold for arbitrary plausibility spaces. We say that two plausibility spaces St and 
S2 are essentially (order) isomorphic if there are supports Cl and Cz of SI and &, respectively, such that 
St /c, is isomorphic to S21c-z, It is easy to see that, as expected, essential isomorphism defines an equivalence 
relation among plausibility spaces. Finally, it is easy to see that if S = ( W, PI), then (U: PI (. 115) ) is essentially 
isomorphic to SIs when we use any conditioning method that satisfies COND. 
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‘Pi(r, m) is the time m projection of P(,,i) IR(IC,(~.~,)) if Pi(r, m) = (L?.,,;), Plc,,,,), 
where fi(r,nl,l) = {(r’,m) E Ki(r,m) I r’ E R(,,ij} and for all A & fl~r,~~,i)+ we have 
that PI (r,,,,,)(A) = Pl(r,i) l~(~,(r,nt))(R(A)). Pl(r,nz,i) is the agent’s plausibility measure 
at (r, m). This process is described in Fig. 3. The main complications are due to the 
transition back and forth between entities defined over runs and ones defined over points. 
We remark that if the system satisfies perfect recall as well as synchrony, our original 
intuition that Pi( r, m+ 1) should be the result of conditioning 7’i( r, m) on the knowledge 
that agent i acquires at (r, m+ 1) can be captured more directly. We can in fact construct 
P;(r, m f 1) from Pi(r, m) by what can be viewed as conditioning on the agent’s new 
information: We take Pi( r, m) and project it one time step forward by replacing each 
point (Y’, m) by (r’, m -t_ 1). We then condition on Ki( Y, m + 1) (i.e., the agent’s 
knowledge at (r,m+ 1)) to get ‘%‘;(r,m,i+ I). 
Proposition 22. Let Z be a synchronous system satis-ing perfect recall such that 
Pl~~,~~,i) is the time m projection Of a prior Plc,ij on runs for all runs r, times m, and 
agents i. Let prev( A) = {( r,m) I (r,m + 1) E A}. Then P1(r,,Tl+~)(A) G P~(,,+I)(B) 
ifand only ifPlc,,,,,(prev(A)) < Pl c~,~,) (prev( B) ), for all runs r, times m, and sets 
A, B E 4,,,+1,. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. Cl 
We say that Z = (R, 7r, P) satisfies PRIOR if Z is synchronous and for each run r 
and agent i there is a prior plausibility PC,,;) such that for all m, ?i( r, m) is the time m 
projection of P,,j,. 
Example 23. It is easy to verify that the two systems we consider in Section 3.2 satisfy 
PRIOR. In both systems, the prior Pc,~, is independent of the run r, and is determined 
by the failure set in each run. 
By using prior plausibility measures, we have reduced the question of where the 
plausibility measure at each point comes from to the simpler question of where the prior 
comes from. While this question is far from trivial, it is analogous to a question that 
needs to be addressed by anyone using a Bayesian approach. Just as with probability 
theory, in many applications there is a natural prior (or class of priors) that we can use. 
By conditioning on plausibility rather than probability, we can deal with a standard 
problem in the Bayesian approach, that of conditioning on an event of measure 0: 
Notice that whenever a prior assigns an event a probability measure of 0 it is not 
possible to condition on that event. The standard solution in the Bayesian school is to 
give every event of interest, no matter how unlikely, a small positive probability. I3 We 
may well discover that a formula C$ that we believed to be true, i.e., one that was true 
in all the most plausible worlds, is in fact false. Under the probabilistic interpretation 
of plausibility, this means that we are essentially conditioning on an event (-4) of 
I3 Of course, this requires that there be only countably many events of interest. 
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measure 0. The plausibility approach has no problem with this: the conditioning process 
described above still makes perfect sense. 
4.1. Conditioning as minimal change of belief 
In this section we examine the properties of conditioning as an approach to minimal 
change of beliefs and relate our approach to others in the literature. 
Recall that QUAL guarantees that belief is closed under logical implication and 
conjunction (Theorem 4). In a synchronous system where the prior satisfies QUAL, it 
is not hard to see that conditioning preserves QUAL. Thus, we get the following result. 
Proposition 24. Let Z be a synchronous system satisfying per$ect recall and PRIOR. If 
the prior Pl(,,, satis$es A2 for all runs r and agents i, then axiom K2 is valid in Z 
for B;. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. Cl 
This result shows that condition A2 is sufficient to get beliefs that satisfy K2. Is it 
also necessary? In general, the answer is no. However, A2 is the most natural condition 
that ensures that K2 is satisfied. To see this, note that if K2 is valid in Z then A2 holds 
for all pairwise disjoint subsets Al, A2 and A3 of points in Z definable in the language 
such that R(&(r, m)) = AI U A2 U A3 for some run r, agent i, and time m. Thus, if 
we assume that the language is rich enough so that all subsets of Z are definable (in 
that, for each subset A and agent i, there is a formula C#J and point (r, m) such that 
A = U4l(r,nr,i) ), then K2 forces A2. 
In view of this discussion, we focus in this section on synchronous systems with a 
qualitative prior. 
Next, we examine how changes in beliefs are determined by the prior. Using Propo- 
sition 22, we now show that we can characterize, within our language, how the agent’s 
beliefs change via conditioning, provided that we can describe in the language what 
knowledge the agent acquired. We say that a formula 4 characterizes agent i’s knowl- 
edge at (r, m + 1) with respect to his knowledge at (r, m) if, for all (r’, m) E Ki( r, m), 
we have (r’,m + 1) k 4 if and only if (r’,m + 1) E &(r,m + 1). That is, among 
the points that succeed points that are considered possible at time m, exactly these 
satisfying 4 are considered possible at time m + 1. Of course, it is not always possible 
to characterize the agent’s new knowledge by a formula in our language. However, in 
many applications we can limit our attention to systems where it is possible. (This is 
the case, for example, in our treatment of revision and update in [ 17,231.) In such 
systems, we can characterize within the agent’s belief change process in the language. 
Proposition 25. Let Z be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. 
If 4 characterizes agent i’s knowledge at (r, m + 1) with respect to his knowledge at 
(r,m), then (Z,r,m+ 1) l= rcI --+ilifandonlyif (T,r,m) +O($r\+l -+;05. 
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 0 
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Corollary 26. Let T be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. If 
4 characterizes agent i’s knowledge at (r, m + 1) with respect to his knowledge at 
(r,m), then (Z,r,m+l) /=BirC, ifandonlyif(Z,r,m) t=K~i(O4* (@+iO$)). 
Moreover, if Z also satisjies SDP, then (2, r, m + 1) b Bi$ if and only if (IT, r, m) k 
04 -)i O*. 
We now use this result to relate our approach to other approaches for modeling 
conditionals in the literature. Boutilier [ 31, Goldszmidt and Pearl [ 3 11, and Lamarre 
and Shoham [43] give conditional statements similar semantics (using a preference 
ordering), but 4 -+ $ is read “after learning 4, + is believed”. Two crucial assumptions 
are made in these papers. The first is that the agent considers only one plausibility 
assessment, which in our terminology amounts to SDP. The second is that propositions 
are static, i.e., their truth value does not change along a run. I4 Formally, a system is 
static if 7~( r(m)) = V( r(0)) for all runs r and times m. This implies that for any 
propositional formula 4, we have that 4 z 04. These two assumptions lead to a 
characterization of belief change. 
Corollary 27. Let Z be a synchronous static system satisfying PRIOR, SDP, and perfect 
recall, and let C$ and t,lr be propositionalfonnulas. If q5 characterizes agent i’s knowledge 
at (r, m + 1) with respect to his knowledge at (r, m), then (Z, r, m + 1) + B# if and 
only if (T, r, m) k 4 ‘i $. 
While this result shows that, in certain contexts, there is a connection between a 
statement such as “typically 4’s are $‘s” (which is how we have between interpreting 
$J -+; I,/J) and “after learning 4, Cc, is believed” (which is how it is interpreted in 
[ 3,3 1,431)) the two readings are in general quite different. For one thing, notice that 
Corollary 27 assumes that 4 and Cc, are propositional formulas. This is a necessary 
assumption. If 4 and I,+ contain modal formulas, then 4 - ti does not necessarily 
imply that the agent believes $ at the next time step. For example, if (Z, r, m) b Bit/r, 
then for any formula 4, we have (Z, r, m) /= q5 -i Bi$, regardless of whether Bitj is 
believed at (r, m -t- 1). In [ 181, we examine conditionals of the form 4 > J++ intended 
to capture the second interpretation “$ is believed after learning +“. The semantics for 
these conditionals involves examining future time points, just as our intuitive reading 
dictates. As we have just seen, > and + are quite different when we consider modal 
formulas in the scope of these conditionals. 
This discussion shows one of the benefits of representing time explicitly. In our 
framework we can distinguish between agents’ plausibility assessment and their belief 
dynamics. Of course, we would like agents to be persistent in their assessment, which 
is exactly what conditioning captures. In the presence of several assumptions, we get a 
close connection between agents’ conditional beliefs and how their beliefs change. This 
allows us to identify some of the assumptions implicitly made in previous approaches. 
For example, all of the approaches we mentioned above would not apply when we 
I4 This assumption is only implicit, since none of these papers have an explicit representation of time, 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this assumption is being made. 
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consider a changing environment, since they cannot reason about how the environment 
changes between one time point and the next. 
Finally, we examine the work of Battigalli and Bonanno [ 21. They consider a logic of 
knowledge, belief, and time, and attempt to capture properties of “minimal change” of 
beliefs. Their language is slightly different from ours. Instead of introducing a temporal 
modality, they define a different belief and knowledge modality for each time step: 
B’qh reads “the agent believes 4 at time t”. Battigalli and Bonanno also assume that 
propositions are static and do not change in time. Thus, the only changes are in terms 
of the agent’s knowledge and belief. Battigalli and Bonanno propose an axiom system 
similar to the axioms of Kraus and Lehmann (that is, they use K5 for knowledge is 
K5, KD45 for belief, and take axioms KBl and KB2 of Section 2.7 to characterize the 
connection between knowledge and belief) that also includes two additional axioms that 
can be written in our language as 
BTl. B; 0 Bi$ + B;4 
BT2. B;#J =+ B; 0 B& 
Battigalli and Bonanno claim that these axioms capture the principle that the agent 
does not change her mind unless new knowledge forces her to do so. Intuitively, this 
principle also applies to conditioning, and thus it is instructive to understand when these 
axioms are satisfied in our framework. 
It turns out that RANK combined with a minimal assumption implies both BTl and 
BT2. We say that a system hasjfinire branching if it allows only finitely many “branches” 
at each local state of an agent (that is there are only finitely many observations that an 
agent can make at each point). 
Lemma 28. Let Z be a synchronous static system satisfying PRIOR, RANK, SDP, and 
petfect recall that has finite branching. Then (I, r, m) k Bi4 H B; 0 B;4 for all 
propositional formulas 4. 
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 0 
Are these conditions necessary to characterize BTl and BT2? The answer is no. First, 
the proof of Lemma 28 applies to systems with infinite branching, if the agents’ prior 
satisfies an infinitary version of A2. As shown in [ 251, this infinitary version is satisfied 
by K-rankings and preference orderings that are well founded (that is, they have no 
infinite descending sequences . . I < w3 < w2 + WI ). Thus, any system with static 
propositions whose prior is induced by a well-founded preference order satisfies BTl 
and BT2. Note that BTl and BT2 do not characterize RANK, since they put restrictions 
only on certain events (ones definable by a conjunction of a formula and the agent’s 
new knowledge at some time point). However, RANK is the most natural restriction 
that implies these axioms. 
Thus, we see that Battigalli and Bonanno essentially require systems with minimal 
change to satisfy conditioning with a prior that is a ranking. As we shall see in the next 
section, similar requirements are made by the AGM formulation of belief revision [ 11. 
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4.2. Properties of prior plausibilities 
If we take the plausibilities in a system to be generated by a prior, then many of the 
conditions we are interested in, such as QUAL and REF, can be viewed as being as being 
induced by the analogous property on the prior. We have considered these properties 
only in the context of Kripke structures for knowledge and probability, so to make sense 
of the prior having the “analogous property”, we have to be able to view the set of runs 
as a Kripke structure for knowledge and probability. Let Z be a synchronous system 
satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. Define M; = (R, 7~‘, Ic;, . . . , XL, P,r, . . , PL), 
where r’ is an arbitrary truth assignment, Icr is the full relation, i.e., R x R, and 
P:(r) = Per,;), the prior of agent i at run r. 
Proposition 29. Let Z be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. 
If M; satisjies QUAL, REF, SDP, UNIF or RANK, then so does 1. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. 0 
Thus, by constructing priors that satisfy various properties, we can ensure that the 
resulting system also satisfies them. In particular, Proposition 29 implies that if Pcr,i) 
is independent of r, so that agent i’s prior is independent of the run he is in, then Z 
satisfies SDP. A somewhat weaker assumption-that the set of runs can be partitioned 
into disjoint subsets Rt, . . . , Rk such that for r, r’ E R,i, we have P(r,i) = Pcr/,i) = 
(Ri, Plj)-ensures that Z satisfies UNIF. Intuitively, the sets ‘Ri correspond to differ- 
ent settings of parameters. Once we set the parameters, then we fix the plausibility 
measure (and it is the same at all runs that have the same setting of the parame- 
ters) . 
We conclude this section by examining whether assuming conditioning limits the 
expressiveness of our belief change operation. A well-known result of Diaconis and 
Zabell [ 1 l] that shows that, in a precise sense, any form of coherent probabilistic 
belief change can be described by conditioning. In particular, they show that, given two 
probability distributions Pr and Pr’ on a finite space W that are coherent in the sense that 
Pr( A) = 0 implies that Pr’( A) = 0, there is a space W* of the form W x X, a subset E of 
W”, and a distribution Pr” on W” such that, for all A c W, we have Pr”( A x X) = Pr( A) 
(so that Pr” can be viewed as an extension of Pr) and Pr’( A) = Pr”( A x X 1 E). 
We can prove a result in a somewhat similar spirit in our framework. The first step is 
to define a plausibilistic analogue of coherence in systems. 
Let Z be a synchronous system. We say that Z is coherent if the following condition 
is satisfied for all r and m: Suppose R s R, A”’ C fi,,,,,i,, %?(A”‘) = R n R( l2cr,m,i)), 
A”‘+’ C fl,,,,+,,i,, and ‘R(A”+l) = R n R(n,,“,+,,i,). If Pl,,,,,,i,(A”‘) = I, then 
Pl~r,,,l+~,i)(A”‘+’ ) = 1. Despite the different formulation, this condition is analogous to 
the probabilistic coherence of Diaconis and Zabell. Roughly speaking, if a set of runs 
has plausibility -L (which is analogous to probability 0 for Diaconis and Zabell) at time 
m, then it is required to have plausibility L at time m + 1. More precisely, coherence 
of a system ensures that sets of runs that were considered implausible at (r, m), either 
by being outside fi,,,,,i, or by being given plausibility Icr,,,,,i), are also considered 
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implausible at (r, m + 1). Note, this condition does not put any constraints on how 
the runs that are considered possible are ordered. It is easy to verify that the following 
axiom is valid in coherent systems: 
COH. Ni 0 cjb =+ ONi4 
Proposition 30. If Z is a synchronous and coherent system, then COH is valid in Z. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. 0 
There is a sense in which the converse to Proposition 30 holds as well: Given a 
synchronous system that is not coherent, we can define a truth assignment r in this 
system for which COH does not hold. l5 
It is easy to see that coherence is a necessary condition for satisfying PRIOR. 
Proposition 31. If Z is a synchronous system satisfying per$ect recall and PRIOR, then 
Z is coherent. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. 0 
Thus, PRIOR forces systems to be coherent, and hence to satisfy COH. It also forces 
systems to satisfy CONS, and hence C5. As we shall see, it also forces some other 
semantic properties. Nevertheless, we can show that for coherent systems that satisfy 
CONS, PRIOR does not force any additional properties, by proving an analogue to the 
Diaconis and &bell result in our framework. 
We say that a formula 4 E LKcT is temporally linear if temporal modalities in 4 
do not appear in the scope of the Ici or +i modalities. Thus, for example, a formula 
such as (4 +i $) + OB& is temporally linear, while Ki( 04 +i O$) + OBi$ 
is not. Temporal linearity ensures that all the temporal connectives in 4 are evaluated 
with respect to a single run. The following result says that, at least for temporally 
linear formulas, we can view belief change in a coherent system Z as coming from 
conditioning on a prior, in the sense that we can embed Z into a larger system where 
this is the case. 
Theorem 32. Let A be a subset of {QUAL,NORM,REF, RANK} and let Z be a 
coherent synchronous system satisfying perfect recall, CONS, and d Then there is a 
synchronous system 27’ satisfying perfect recall, PRIOR, and A, and a mapping f : 
72 H ‘R’ such that for all temporally linearformulas 4 E LKcT, we have (2, r, m) k 4 
if and only if (I?,f(r),m) k 4. I6 
Is We remark that COH is analogous to the axiom Ki 0 q!~ =S OK;4 that characterizes perfect recall in 
synchronous systems [ 151. Roughly speaking, this is because coherence ensures that the agent does not forget 
what she ruled out as implausible. 
I6 We note that this result is, in a sense, stronger than Diaconis and Zabell’s. They examine only the probability 
of events, which are essentially propositional formulas (i.e., formulas without modal operators). 
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Proof. See Appendix AS. 0 
Notice that formulas that just compare an agent’s beliefs (or knowledge) at succes- 
sive time points are temporally linear. All the AGM postulates and the KM postulates 
(when translated to our language) are of this form. Not surprisingly, as we show in 
[ 17,231, these postulates can be captured by systems with the appropriate prior plausi- 
bility. 
Can we extend Theorem 32 to the full language? We conjecture that Theorem 32 
actually holds for all 4 E LKcT, not just temporally linear formulas. This conjecture 
implies that a formula is valid with respect to synchronous systems satisfying perfect 
recall, CONS, and PRIOR if and only if it is valid with respect to synchronous coherent 
systems satisfying CONS and perfect recall. That is, except for COH and C9, we do 
not get any new properties by assuming PRIOR and CONS. 
Note that the construction described by Theorem 32 does not necessarily preserve SDP 
or UNIF in the transformation from 1 to Z’. This is due to the fact that in the presence 
of SDP or UNIF, PRIOR forces new semantic properties. Recall that UNIF implies that 
there is a partition of possible points such that two points (Y, m) and (8, m’) are in the 
same cell if and only if P;( r, m) = P;( r’, m’). Let PERSIST be the requirement that 
this partition changes minimally in time. More precisely, we say that a system satisfies 
PERSIST if for all runs r, r’ E R and m such that (r, m+ 1) -i (r’, m+ 1)) we have that 
P;(r,m+l) =pi(r’,m+l) ifandonly if Pi(r,m) =P,(r’,m). Intuitively,PERSIST 
(in the presence of synchrony, perfect recall, and CONS) implies that the partition of 
points at time m + 1 is determined by the partition of corresponding points at time m 
and the knowledge relation at time m + 1. 
Proposition 33. If 1 is a synchronous system that satisfies pelfect recall and either 
PRIOR and UNIF, or SDP, then Z satisfies PERSIST. 
Proof. Straightforward; left to the reader. q 
It is not clear to us at this stage whether PERSIST forces new properties in our 
language. However, if we assume that PERSIST holds, we can get a result analogous to 
Theorem 32. 
Theorem 34. Let A be a subset of {QUAL, NORM, REF, SDP, UNIF, RANK} and let 
Z be a coherent synchronous system satisfying pelfect recall, CONS, PERSIST, and 
A. Then there is a synchronous system 1’ satisfying peeect recall, PRIOR, and A, 
and a mapping f : R H R’ such that for all temporally linear formulas 4 E .CKcr, 
(1, r, m) k 4 if and only if CT’, f(r), ml k #. 
Proof. See Appendix AS. 0 
Thus, the question of whether PRIOR forces new properties in the presence of UNIF 
reduces to the question of whether PERSIST forces new properties. Finally, since SDP 
implies PERSIST, PRIOR does not force new properties in the presence of SDP. 
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Our discussion of conditioning and priors up to now assumed synchrony and per- 
fect recall. Can we make sense of conditioning when we relax these assumptions? 
Note that the definition of PRIOR does not rely on perfect recall. PRIOR is well 
defined even in systems where agents can forget. However, in such systems, the intu- 
itions that motivated the use of PRIOR are no longer valid. In particular, PRIOR does 
not imply coherence and the analogue to Proposition 22 does not hold: we no longer 
can construct ?i( r, m + 1) from pi( r, m) since runs that are considered impossible at 
time m might be considered possible at time m + 1. I7 Dropping the assumption of 
synchrony also leads to problems, even in the presence of perfect recall. In an asyn- 
chronous setting, an agent might consider several points on the same run possible. 
The question then arises as to how (or whether) we should distribute the plausibility 
of a run over these points. Two approaches are considered in a probabilistic setting 
in [51], in the context of analyzing games with imperfect recall. It would be of in- 
terest to see to what extent these approaches can be carried over to the plausibilistic 
setting. 
5. Conclusion 
We have proposed a framework for belief dynamics that combines knowledge, time, 
and plausibility (and hence beliefs), and investigated a number of properties of the 
framework, such as complete axiomatizations for various sublanguages and various 
properties of the relationships between the modal operators. Of course, the obvious 
question is why we should consider this framework at all. 
There are two features that distinguish our approach from others. The first is that 
we use plausibility to model uncertainty, rather than other approaches that have been 
mentioned in the literature, such as preference orderings on worlds or c-semantics. 
The second is that we include knowledge and time, as well as belief, explicitly in the 
framework. 
We could have easily modified the framework to use other ways of modeling uncer- 
tainty. Indeed, in a preliminary version of this paper [ 191, we used preference orderings. 
We have chosen to use plausibility measures for several reasons. First, plausibility mea- 
sures generalize all approaches to representing uncertainty that we are aware of. The use 
of plausibility makes it easier to compare our approach, not only to preference-based 
approaches (e.g., [ 31) , but also to approaches based on K-rankings (e.g., [ 3 I] >, prob- 
ably measures (e.g., [ 35]), or any other measure of uncertainty. More importantly, it 
makes it easier for us to incorporate intuitions from other approaches. We have already 
seen one example of this phenomenon in the present paper: we defined a plausibilis- 
tic analogue of conditioning, and used it to model minimal change. As we show in 
[23], we can represent the standard approaches to minimal change-belief revision 
and belief update-in terms of conditioning. Moreover, the semantic characterization 
of conditioning should allow us to apply it more easily to deal with complications 
“We could, of course, redefine PRIOR so as to guarantee that Proposition 22 holds, but this leads to other 
complications. 
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that arise when the language lets us reason about multiple agents, actions, and be- 
liefs about beliefs. Another example of adopting probabilistic intuitions is given in 
[ 17,20,22], where plausibilistic analogues of independence and Markov chains are de- 
scribed and used to define a novel approach to belief change. We believe that these 
notions will have applications elsewhere as well. Finally, plausibility measures have 
the advantage of greater expressive power than other approaches. For example, work 
on defaults has mainly focused on properties of structures with a finite number of 
worlds. In our framework, however, even a simple system with two global states might 
have an uncountable number of runs. As shown in [ 251, once we examine structures 
with infinitely many worlds, qualitative plausibility measures can capture natural order- 
ing of events that cannot be captured by preference orderings, possibility measures, or 
K-rankings. 
As we have tried to argue throughout the paper, the explicit representation of knowl- 
edge and time makes it much easier to study belief dynamics. Most current work in the 
area examines only the beliefs of an agent and how they change after incorporating a 
new belief. Many simplifying assumptions are made: that there is a single agent, that 
the agent’s knowledge does not change, that new information can be characterized in 
the language, and so on. It is useful to study this simple setting in order to get at the 
basic issues of belief change. However, these simplifying assumptions are not suitable 
when we want examine belief change in more realistic settings (such as the diagnosis 
example of Section 3.2). This means that most of the results in the current belief change 
literature are not directly applicable in many standard AI problems. Our framework dis- 
penses with most of the simplifying assumptions made in the literature, and thus can 
be viewed as a first step towards providing a model of more realistic settings of belief 
change. 
We have focused here on the foundations of the framework. In the future, we hope to 
apply the framework to examine more realistic problems. We have already begun to do 
this. For example, in [ 191 we provide a detailed analysis of iterated prisoner dilemma 
games between two agents. It is well-known that the players cannot cooperate when 
they have common knowledge of rationality. However, we show that they can cooperate 
when they have common belief of rationality. A recent proposal by van der Meyden 
1471 for multi-agent belief change can easily be embedded in our framework [ 481. We 
hope to use our framework to study some of the problems considered by van der Mey- 
den, such as speech-act semantics. Another natural application area is reasoning about 
actions and planning in the presence of uncertainty. We believe that the flexibility and 
expressive power of the framework will help to clarify what is going on in all these 
areas. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
A. I. Proofs for Section 2.7 
Theorem 7. K (respectively K45, KD45) is a sound and complete axiomatization jar 
LB with respect to M (respectively MCoNS, MCoNS,NoRM). 
Proof. As usual, soundness is straightforward, so we focus on completeness. We prove 
completeness by showing that for M E MK (respectively M$ Mz’) there is a struc- 
ture M+ E M (respectively MCoNS, MCoNS,NoRM) such that for all 4 E LB, we have 
(M, w) k 4 if and only if (M+, w) b r,b. Completeness then follows from Theo- 
rem 1. 
Let M = (W,T,&,... , l3,,) be a Kripke structure for belief. We construct a Kripke 
structure for knowledge and plausibility M+ = (W, VT, ICI,. . _ , &,,?I,. . _ , P,,) as fol- 
lows. We set x;(w) to be the set of worlds where agent i’s beliefs are the same as in 
w. Formally, (w, o) E Ici if&(w) = a,(~!). It is easy to verify that Ici is an equivalence 
relation. We define 7’i( w) = (fl,,,.,~, PI,,,,)), where fi,w,i, = B;(w) is the set of worlds 
agent i considers possible, Pl(,,.,i)(@) =O, and PI,,,,,)(A) is 1 if A C WoV.;) is not empty 
It is easy to verify that these (trivial) plausibility measures are qualitative. 
We now prove that (M, w) k 4 if and only (M+, w) k 4 for any $ E CB. This is 
shown by induction on the structure of r$. The only interesting case is if 4 is of the 
form Bi@. Assume (M, w) k Bi4’. We want to show that (M+, w) k K;( true -+i 4’). 
We start by noting that (w, u) E Ic; if and only if B;(u) = B;(w). This implies that 
?i(v) = p;(w). Thus, (M+, u) k true --+i 4’ if and only if (M+, w) k true *i 4’. 
Thus, it suffices to show that (M+, w) /= true-+i qb’, since this implies that (M+, w) k 
K;( true --+; 4’)) i.e., (M+, w) k Bit$‘. There are two cases. If B;(w) = 0, then fi,,,.,,, = 
0. This implies that true +i qfr’ holds vacuously. If B,(w) is not empty, then using 
the induction hypothesis we conclude that [[+‘]I,,,.,,, = B;(w). From the definition of 
Pl(,,.,;) we conclude that Pl(,,,i,([[~‘]],..,,,) = 1 and that Pl()L.,i)([[~~‘]](,,.,,)) = 0. Thus, 
(M+,w) k true--+;@ and hence (M+, w) ~Ki(true---+;#). Now assume (M,w) b 
7Bi~‘. Then there is some u E Bi( W) such that (M, u) /= 14’. Using the induction 
hypothesis we conclude that PI fr~,i)([[l~‘]](~v,i)) = 1. Hence. (M+,w) /= l(true--+;#) 
and therefore, (M+, w) k TK;( true +i 4’). 
It remains to show that if M E b-f: then M+ satisfies CONS, and if M E Mg’, 
then Mf also satisfies NORM. Assume Bi is transitive and Euclidean. Let w and P 
be worlds such that ( LV, L’) E B,. We claim that B,(w) = B;(u). If (w, t) E 6, 
then since B; is Euclidean we get that (u, t) E B;. If (t!, t) E B,, then since B; 
is transitive we get that (w, t) E Bi. Thus, B,(o) = ai( as desired. Recall that 
if Bj( U) = Bi( w), then our construction ensures that c E Ki( w). Hence, B,( )v) C 
Kj( W) and M+ satisfies CONS. Assume that 23; is serial. This implies that for all w, 
B,(w) is not empty. Thus, our construction guarantees that &..,;J is not empty and 
Pl(,,~,,)(&,,,,,) >1. q 
Theorem 8. AXKB (respectively AXKB,CoNS, AXKB,CoNS,NoRM ) is a sound and complete 
axiomatization of LKB with respect to M (respectively MCoNS, MCoNS,NoRM). 
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Proof. Again soundness is straightforward, so we focus on completeness. We sketch 
a completeness proof following the usual Makinson [46] style of proof. We describe 
only the parts that are different from the standard proofs. See, for example, Halpern and 
Moses [34] for details. 
In order to prove completeness, we need only show that if the formula 4 is consistent 
with the axiom system (i.e., AXKB, AXKB,CoNS or AXKB,CoNS,NoRM) then 4 is satisfi- 
able in a Kripke structure of the appropriate class (i.e., M, MCoNS, or MCoNS.NoRM, 
respectively). 
Let V be a set of formulas and AX an axiom system. We say that V is AX-consistent 
if for all 4,). . . q& E V, it is not the case that AX t- ~(41 A . . A $J,,). The set V is 
a maximal consistent set if it is consistent, and for each formula 4, either + E V or 
-4 E v. 
We now build a canonical model MKB for AXKB, in which every AXKB-consistent 
formula is satisfiable. MKB has a world WV corresponding to every maximal AXKB- 
consistent set V of formulas; we show that ( MKB, WV) k q5 if and only if 4 E V. 
We proceed as follows. If V is a set of formulas, define VK, = (4 1 Ki$ E V} and 
VIBi={~IBi~~V}.LetMKB=(~~,IC] ,..., Ic,,,pi ,..., pjP,,),where 
l W = {wv 1 V is a maximal AXKB-consistent set of formulas} 
l r(wv)(i>) = true if and only if p E V 
. K; = {(M~,w/) I V/K, c: u> 
l P;(w) = (f4bv,,,),Pl(w,.;)), where fl(,v,i, = {WI: I V/Bi C cl}, Pl(,,,;)(fJ> = 0, and 
P~c,,.,,~,(A) = 1 for A # 8. 
Using standard arguments, it is easy to show that the Lois are equivalence relations 
(see [34]). Using a standard induction argument, we can verify that (MKB, WV) k 4 
if and only if 4 E V. 
This construction proves completeness for AXKB. To prove completeness for the 
other two variants we use the same construction, setting W to correspond to the 
maximal AXKB,CoNs-consistent sets (respectively AXKB*CoNS,NoRM-consistent sets). We 
must show that the resulting canonical models satisfy CONS and NORM, respec- 
tively. 
Let MKB,CoNS be the canonical model constructed for AXKB,CoNs. To show that 
MKB,CoNS satisfies CONS, it is enough to show that V/K; & V/B;. To show this, assume 
4 E VKi. Then Ki4 E V. Since KB2 E AXKB,CoNS, we conclude that Bi4 E V, and 
thus 4 E VB,. 
Let MKB.CoNs,NoRM be the canonical model constructed for AXKB,CoNSsNoRM. The 
argument above shows that MKB,CoNS,NoRM satisfies CONS. To show that it satisfies 
NORM, i.e., Pl,,,;,( Oc,,;)) >i, it is enough to show that V/Bi is consistent, for then 
there must be some U such that VBi E U. Assume, by way of contradiction, that VBi is 
inconsistent. Then there are formulas 41,. . . , q$,, E V/B; such that E -( 4, A. A q5,,,). 
Since ~$1, . . . , q4,, E VBi, we conclude that Bi41,. . , Bi+nl E V. Using the K45 axioms 
for B;, standard arguments show that Bi (41, . . . , & ) E V, and hence that Bi($ulse) E V, 
which contradicts the consistency of V. Cl 
Lemma 10. Let M be a propositional Kripke structure of knowledge and plausibility 
sutisjj@ CONS and SDP. Suppose that w. i, and (Y are such that the most plausible 
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worlds in Pi(w) are exactly those worlds in K;(w) that satisfy a, i.e., MP(Pi( w)) = 
{w’ E Ic;( w) 1 (M, w’) b a}. Then for any formula 4 E .CKB that includes only the 
modalities Ki and Bi, (M, W) b q5 if and only if (M, W) /= +*, where 4* is the result 
of recursively replacing each subformula of the form B;I++ in q5 by Ki(a + +*). 
Proof. We prove by induction that for any w’ E Ki( w), (M, w’) k 4 if and only 
if (M, w’) /= 4*. The only interesting case is if 4 has the from Bi4’. Suppose that 
(M, W’) k Bi#‘. Th is implies that (M, w’) k true--+;@, i.e., for all w” E MP( Pi( w’) ) 
we have (M, w”) /= 4’. Now let w” E Ki( w’). If (M, w”) /= SLY, then (M, w”) b (Y + 
(4’) *. If (M, w”) k cy then, by definition, w” E MP( Pi( W) ), and since we assumed 
SDP, MP( ‘Pi( w’) ) = MP( ?‘i( w) ) . Thus, we conclude that (M, w”) /= #, and using 
the induction hypothesis we get that (M, w”) k (4’) *. We conclude that all worlds 
in K;(w’) satisfy cz + (#)*, and thus (M,w’) 1 Ki(a + (#)*). NOW assume that 
(M,W’) k Ki(cW * (4’)*). L t e w” be any world in Ic;( w’). Since we assumed SDP, 
we have that MP(Pi(w”)) = MP(Pi(w)) is the set of worlds in xi(w) that satisfy LY. 
We conclude, using our induction hypothesis, that all worlds in MP( Pi( W”)) satisfy 
#I’. Hence, (M, w”) /= true *i 4’. Since this is true for all w” E Ki( w’) we conclude 
that (M, w’) b Bid’. 0 
A.2. Proofs for Section 2.8 
Theorem 11. AX is a sound and complete axiomatization for LKC with respect to M. 
Proof. Again, we just describe the completeness proof. This proof draws on the usual 
completeness proofs for S5 modal logic, and the completeness proof for conditional 
logic described in [ 17,241. 
We proceed as follows. If V is a set of formulas, define VKi = (4 1 Ki+ E V} 
and V/N, = {q!~ 1 Ni4 E V}. We define a canonical model MC = (W,r,K:l,. . . ,Kn, 
Pi,. . , ‘p,) as fOllOWSI 
l W = {wv 1 V is a maximal AX-consistent set of formulas} 
l r( WV) (p) = true if and only if p E V 
l Ki = {(WV,WU) 1 VKi C u} 
l Pi( WV) = (fi(w,,i) t F(wv,i), Pl(w,,i) 1, where 
. a( bvv,i) = {WC/ ( V/Ni C u}, 
F((wv,i) = { 141 (wv,i) I 4~ E CKC} where [dl(wv,i) = {wu E W(wv,i) I 4 E U}, and 
. Pl (,+“,;) is such that Pl(w~,i)([4l(wv,i)> < Pl(w”,i)([$l(wv,i)> f and only if (4 V 
9) +i$ E V. 
We need to verify that MC is indeed a structure in M. Using standard arguments it is 
easy to show that the Ici relations are equivalence relations. In [ 17,241 we prove that 
Pi( WV) is a well-defined qualitative plausibility space. 
Finally, we have to show that (MC, WV) k C$ if and only if 4 E V. As usual, this is 
done by induction on the structure of 4. We use the standard argument for formulas of 
the form Ki@ and arguments from [ 17,241 for formulas of the from C$ +i $. We omit 
the details here. 0 
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Theorem 12. Let A be a subset of {RANK, NORM, REF, UNIF, CONS, SDP} and let 
A be the corresponding subset of {C5,C6, C7,C8,C9,ClO}. Then AX U A is a sound 
and complete axiomatization with respect to the structures in M satisfying A. 
Proof. Yet again, we focus on completeness. We obtain completeness in each case by 
modifying the proof of Theorem 11. We construct a canonical model as in that proof, 
checking consistency with the extended axiom system. The resulting structure is in M 
and has the property that (M, WV) /= 4 if and only if 4 E V. We just need to show that 
this structure also satisfies the corresponding semantic restrictions. 
First, we consider CONS and axiom C9. Assume that C9 is included as an axiom. It 
is easy to see that this implies that V/N; 2 V/K;. This implies that J+?(wV,i) C_ Ici(wv) in 
our construction. 
Now consider the relationship between SDP and ClO. Assume that Cl0 is included as 
an axiom. We need to show that if wt, E x;( WV), then P;( wu) = P,( WV). It is enough 
to show that $ +i q+ E V if and only if 4 -+; @ E II, since these statements determine 
P; in our construction. Assume 4 4; Cc, E V. Then, according to ClO, Ki( 4 +i @) E V, 
and thus c5 --+; Cc, E V/K,. Recall that wu E Ki(wv) only if V/Ki C U. We conclude 
that + +-; I,+ E U. The other direction follows from the fact that K, is symmetric in our 
construction, and thus WV E Ki( wu). 
The desired relationship between RANK, NORM, REF, and UNIF and the axioms 
C.5, C6, C7, and C8 is proved in [ 17,241, for a logic that does not mention knowledge. 
Since these conditions put restrictions on Pi(w) and do not involve knowledge, the 
proof of [ 17,241 goes through unchanged; we do not repeat it here. 0 
Theorem 13. Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK}. The 
formula ~TJ is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only if it is satisfiable 
in a Kripke structure with at most 21S’rh(‘#‘)l worlds. 
Proof. The proof of this theorem relies on techniques from [21]. We sketch only the 
main steps here. The proof is based on a standard filtration argument. 
Suppose there is a structure M and a world w in M such that (M, w) b 4. Let 
Sub+(q5) = Sub(q5) U (-4 / qb E &b(4)}. We say that V C &b+(4) is an atom 
if for each d E &b(4), either 4 E V or -4 E V. We say that a world w in M 
satisfies an atom V if for all 4 E V, we have (M, w) k 4. It is easy to see that 
each world satisfies exactly one atom. Given a world w’, we define [w] to be the 
equivalence class containing all worlds that satisfy the same atom as w. For each 
equivalence class [WI, we arbitrarily choose a representative world WI,,/ E [w]. We 
defineM’=(W’,r’,ICi ,... KA,P[ ,..., PL), where 
l w’= {[WI / w E W}, 
l T’( [WI) = ~(W[,vI), 
l Kj={([w],[~‘]) 1 (w,w’) E Ki}, and 
l P:([wl) = (n;,,,,,i,,P1’,,..,,i,), where 
. fi;,pv,,i, = {[w’l I W’ E a(w,,cj,i)} and 
P1;Ibb,l,i,(A) G Pl;,w,,i,(B) ifPl(,,,~,,i)(A*nn(,,,,~,,i)) G Pl(wl,,I,i)(B*nn(,,,~,,,)), 
where A* = {w” 1 3[w’] E A, w” E [w’]}. 
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Arguments essentially identical to those of [21] show that (M’, [w] ) f= t,b if and only 
if (M,w) +(cl f or all rC, E Sub( 4) ; we omit details here. 
We now have to describe how to modify this argument to ensure that M’ satisfies A. 
The modifications for NORM, REF, UNIF and RANK are described in [ 211. Suppose 
that M satisfies CONS. Let [w’] E f2{,,,,,j,. By definition, w’ E fl(,,,,,,,i). But since 
M satisfies CONS, we have that w’ E Ici( wl rrl). By definition, we get that [w’] E 
K(( [w] ). We conclude that M’ satisfies CONS. Finally, suppose that M satisfies SDI? 
We force M’ to satisfy SDP as follows. For all worlds w, we choose a representative 
world wx,(lwl) E Icc( [w]) such that if (w,w’) E K,, then w~,([~~]) = w~c,([~fl). We 
then modify the construction so that, for each world c E Ici( w), we have I?! ( [u] ) = 
‘P;( WK,(I~,.I)). It is easy to see that for all + +i x E SuD( #J), we have that (M, w) + 
fi -i ,y if and only if CM, WIC,(I~I)) k CcI --+; x. Thus, it is easy to show that after 
this modification we still have that (M’, [w]) /= Cc, if and only if (M, w) k $ for all 
l/Q E&b(4). 0 
Theorem 15. Let A be a subset of {CONS, NORM, REF, SDP, UNIF, RANK} contuin- 
ing CONS and either SDP or UNIF. If qb talks about the knowledge and plausibility of 
only one agent, then q5 is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only if 
it is satisfiable in a preferential Kripke structure satisfying A with at most ISub( q5) I3 
worlds. 
Proof. Assume M = ( W; 7r, ICI, PI) is a structure satisfying 4. Since CONS is in 
A, we must have that fi(,,i) C ICI (w) ). Without loss of generality, we can assume 
that ICI consists of one equivalence class, that is, that ICI = W x W. Since CONS 
and SDP imply UNIF, and since A contains CONS and either SDP or UNIF, we 
conclude that M satisfies UNIF. Using techniques from [21] we can assume, without 
loss of generality, that for each world w, the plausibility space Pi(w) is preferential 
(i.e., induced by some preference ordering) and that fi,,,,i, has at most ISub 1’ 
worlds. 
Choose wo E W such that (M, WO) b $. For each formula ~Klt,4 E Sub($) such 
that (M, WO) k ~KIv+/, we select a world w,,, such that (M, we) /= -$. Let T be 
{we} U {w+ 1 -KI$ E Sub( c$)}. Note that the cardinality of T is at most lSub( q5) I. 
Define M’ = ( W', T’, K{ , Pi) by taking W’ to be the union of Q;,,,, ) for each w E T, 
taking r’ to be z- restricted to W’, and taking Pi (w) = Pi (w). Clearly I W’I is at most 
ISub( 4) 13. A straightforward argument for all subformulas $ of 4 and all worlds w’ E 
W’, we have (M, w’) k Cc, if and only if (M’, w’) /= $. It follows that (M’, WO) k 4, 
so 4 is satisfiable in a small preferential structure. q 
Theorem 16. Let A be a subset of {CONS, NORM, REF, SDP, UNIF,RANK}. If 
CONS E A, but it is not the case that UNIF or SDP is in A, then the validity problem 
with respect to structures satisfying A is complete for exponential time. Otherwise, the 
validity problem is complete for polynomial space. 
Proof. The proof combines ideas from [ 14,21,34]. We briefly sketch the main ideas 
here, referring the reader to the other papers for details. 
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The polynomial space lower bound follows from the polynomial space lower bound 
for logics of knowledge alone [ 341. For the exponential lower bound we use exactly 
the lower bound described Fagin and Halpern [ 141 for the combination of knowledge 
and probability (which is in turn based on the lower bound for PDL [ 161). This lower 
bound construction uses only formulas involving Ki and probabilistic statements of the 
form VV;( 4) = 1 (i.e., the probability of 4 is 1). Since Ni@ has exactly the same 
properties as w;( 4) = 1, the same construction applies to our logic. 
In the cases where we claim a polynomial space upper bound, this is shown by 
proving that if a formula 4 is satisfiable at all, it is satisfiable in a structure that looks 
like a tree, with polynomial branching and depth no greater than the depth of nesting of 
Ic, and +i operators in 4. The result now follows along similar lines to corresponding 
results for logics of knowledge. 
Finally, the exponential time upper bound follows by showing that if a formulas is 
satisfiable at all, it is satisfiable in an exponential size structure that can be constructed 
in deterministic exponential time; the technique is similar to that used to show that 
logics of knowledge with common knowledge are decidable in deterministic exponential 
time [ 341 or that PDL is decidable in deterministic exponential time [ 521. 0 
Theorem 17. Let A be a subset of {CONS, NORM, REF, SDP, UNIF, RANK} contuin- 
irlg CONS and either UNIF or SDP. For the case of one agent, the validity problem in 
structures satisjjGng A is co-NP-complete. 
Proof. We show that the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. It follows that the validity 
problem is co-NP-complete. The lower bound is immediate, since clearly the logic is 
at least as hard as propositional logic. For the upper bound, by Theorem 15, q5 is 
satisfiable in a structure satisfying A if and only if q5 is satisfiable in a structure M of 
size polynomial in 141. We simply guess a structure M and check that 4 is satisfiable. It 
is easy to show that model checking can be done in polynomial time (see [ 21,341). 0 
A.3. Proofs for Section 3.3 
Theorem 20. The axiom system AX’ is a sound and complete axiomatization of CKcT 
with respect to C. 
Proof. As usual, we focus on completeness. Again, we construct a canonical interpreted 
system Z such that if C#J E CKcT is consistent, then 4 is satisfied 1. The outline of 
the proof is similar to that of Theorem 11. 
We proceed as follows. Let V be a maximal AXr-consistent set of formulas in LKcT. 
We define vc> = (4 1 04 E V}. W e c aim that V/O is also a maximal AXr-consistent 1 
set. To show that V/O is maximal, assume that 4 $ V/O. Then 04 $ V. From axiom 
T2, we have that 0-4 E V, and thus, -4 E VO. This shows that VO is maximal. 
To show that VO is AXr-consistent, assume that there are formulas ~$1,. .c#+ E If0 
such that E *x7 ~(41 A...A&>. From Kl, Tl and RTl we get thatfalse E V/O. Thus, 
Qfalse E V. Using T2 we get that 1 0 true E V. Using RTl, however, we get that 
Orrue E V, which contradicts the assumption that V is consistent. Thus, VO is AXT- 
consistent. Finally, we define V/O”’ to the result of m applications of /O. Repeated 
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applications of the above argument show that V/O”’ is a maximal AXr-consistent set 
for all m 3 0. 
We construct a canonical interpreted system as follows. Let Z = (72, 7~, Pr , . . . , P,), 
where 
0 R={r”IvcLKO is a maximal AXr-consistent set} such that 
. r:(m) = VO”“, and 
r:(m) = (vO”‘)/K;, 
l z-(r”,m)(p) = true if and only if p E r!(m), and 
l R(r”, m) = (W(,v,,,,;), Pl(rv,m,i) >, where 
. W(P,n,,i) = {(r’, n) I (VO”‘)/K C U/O” }, and 
. Pl (rv,,,I,i) is such that Pl(rv,rtt,i) ( [dl (rv,rrr,i) 1 < Pl(rv.n,,i) ( [+I (~,~,,i) 1 if and only if 
(4 V ti) +i $ E v/O”‘t where [41 (r’,rn,i) = {(r’, k) E W(rv,m,i) I 4 E u/O”). 
Using the arguments in the completeness proof for conditional logic of [ 17,241, 
we can show that ‘Pi(r,m) is well-defined for all i. Finally, we have to show that 
(Z, r”, m) + qb if and only if 4 E r!(m). As usual, this is done by induction on 
the structure of 4. This is identical to the proof in of Theorem 11 except for the 0 
modality, which is handled by standard arguments. We omit the details here. 0 
Theorem 21. Let A be a subset of {RANK, NORM, REF, UNIF, CONS, SDP} and let 
A be the corresponding subset of (C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C 10). Then AXT U A is a sound 
and complete axiomatization with respect to systems in C satisfying A. 
Proof. Again, we focus on completeness. We obtain completeness in each case by 
modifying the proof of Theorem 20. We construct a canonical system as in that proof, 
checking consistency with the extended axiom system. The resulting system has the 
property that (1, r”,m) + 4 if and only if $ E VO”‘. We just need to show that 
this system satisfies the corresponding semantic restrictions. The desired relationship 
between these semantic properties and axioms is proved in [ 17,241 and the proof of 
Theorem 12. 0 
A.4. Proofs for Section 4. I 
Proposition 25. Let Z be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. 
If 4 characterizes agent i’s knowledge at (r, m + 1) with respect to his knowledge at 
(r,m), then (Z,r,m+ 1) Ffi +i 5 if and only if (1, r, m) k 0<4 A @> +i 05. 
Proof. Expanding the definition we get that 
Similarly, we get that 
~([[+ll,,,,,+r~) ={r’E Q(j) / (r’,m+l> -i (r,m+l),(r’,m+l) I=$}. 
However, since 4 characterizes agent i’s knowledge at time m + 1 with respect to his 
knowledge at time m, we get that (r’, m + 1) -; (r, m + 1) if and only if (r’, m) -; 
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(r,m) and (r,m+ 1) k4. We conclude thatR(nO(~A~)n,,,,,,> =R([[@]]lr,,,+,,). 
The lemma now follows directly from Proposition 22. 0 
Lemma 28. bet Z be a .synchronous static system satisfying PRIOR, RANK SDP, and 
petfect recall that has jinite branching. Then (2, r, m) b B;d E Bi 0 Bi4 for all 
propositional formulas 4. 
Proof. For aII points (r, m) in Z, note that n(r,,,,i) = U{&,), where A* is the set of 
points (r’, m) -i (r, m) such that the agent’s new knowledge at time m + 1 is q. If 
1 has finite branching, this is a finite partition of a(,,,~). Additionally, note that if 
Pl(,-,,,l.ij is a rankmg, and CI , . . . , Ck is a finite partition of C, then since Pl(,,,,i,(C) = 
maxI <,j<k Pl( r,m,i) (C,;), there must be some j such that Pl(r,m,i)(C,;) = Pl(r,m,i)(C). In 
particular, for all C 2 W(r,nl.i), either Pl(r,m,;)(C) = T or Pl(r,a,i)(W(r,n,,i) - C) = T. 
For the “+j” part, suppose that (1, r, m) b Bi4. If Pl(,,,,,i) (W(r,nl,i)) = L then 
(1, r, 112) /= B; 0 Bi4 vacuously. If Plcr,m,;) ( W(r,,l,,i) ) # L then P4r,nl,i) ( [[41] cr,n,,;) ) > 
pl,,. .,,,, i ( [[-c$]],,..,,,,;,). Assume that I,!J is such that Pl(r,,n,,)(A*) = T. It is easy to verify 
that since Pl(r,,7,,i) is a ranking, we get that 
Pl,,m.i,(A, ” 8411,,,,,,,;, 1 > Pl(r.m.i) (AIL n [[~4lI(,,,,,i~ 1. 
Let r’ be a run such that (r’,m) E A,J,. By SDP, we get that I’](,,,,,) = Pl(,~,,,,,), and 
thus 
By definition of A$,, we have that (r”, m + 1) -i (r’, m + 1) if and only if (r”, m) E 
A,,,. Since Z satisfies PRIOR, Pl(r/,,,l+i,i) is the result of conditioning Pl(,,,?,,i) on Ati,. 
Moreover, since propositions are static, we get that 
PI (r’,nl+l.i)([[~ll(r~,nl+~.;)) > p](,~,,,,+l,i)([[~~ll(r/,,,,+I,i,). 
Thus, (2, r’, m) + OBi@. We conclude that A+ C [[OBi4](r,,7,,i)> and thus 
Pl(r,n,.i) ( [[OBd]] (r,,Jr,i) 1 = T. 
Moreover, since A$ 2 [[OB,4]],,,,,,,i, for all A+ such that Pl(,,,,,i)( A+) = T, we get that 
Pl(rm.i) ! [I- 0 BdII(,,,,,;) >6 max{Plcr,,,,,i) (A$, IPl(rm,i) (A$,) < T} < T. 
We conclude that 
Pl(r.,l,.i) ( [[OBi4]](.,,,,,i, ) > Pl(r,,~,i) ( I[-0 Bi4ll(,,m,;) ) 7 
and thus, (Z, r, m) k Bi 0 Bi4. 
For the “G=” part, suppose that (1, r, m) b B, () Bi4. If P~c~,,~,,;) (Wcr,nl,i)) = I, then 
(z, r, m) b Bi4 vacuously. If Pl(,,,ll,i) ( W(r,n,,i)) f 1, then Pl(r,ll,,i) ( [[OBi4]](,,,,,i)) > 
PI (r,nl,i) ( [[-O&411~,,,,,i~ ). Thus, since ?r,nr,i) is a ranking, Pl(r,m,i) ( [[OBi4]](,,,,i, > = T. 
Let (r’, m) be some point in Ati for some $. By SDP, we have that (Z, r’, m) k OBq5 
if and only if (Z,r”,m) k OB4 for all points (r”,m) E A@. Thus, 
iOBi+ll (r,m,i) = A,, u . . U A,, forsome&,...,&. 
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Since Pl (r,nr,;) ( [[OBdll (r,nl,i) > > Pl(r,m,i) ( [[TOBi4II(r,,,,i) ) t we get that Pl(r,nr,i) (A$) = T 
only if fi = +,i for some 1 < j 6 k. Moreover, since A$,, , . . . , A, is a finite partition 
Of [[OBdll (r,m,i) 7 there must be at least one 1 < j < k such that Pl(,,,,i,(Ae,) = T. Let 
q,; be such that Pl,,.,,,,i) (A$,) = T. Suppose that (Y’, m) E A*, . Then we have that 
PI (r’,nr+l,i) ( [I411 (r’,nr+l,i)) > P1(r’,~~+l.i)(~l~ll(,‘,,,,+I,I)) 
Since Z is synchronous, static, and satisfies perfect recall, PRIOR, and SDP, we get that 
Pl (r,nr,i) (Ati, n Ii+ll,,,,,,i, ) > Pl(.wi) (A$, ” [[b~ll,r,t,,,i, ). 
Since Plcr,,,,i) is a ranking, we get that Pl(r,m,i)(Aa,+, n [[41],,,, i,> = T, and thus, 
Pl (r.mi) ( [[411 (r,m,i) ) = T. Finally, if Pl(,,,,i) (Ati,) < T, then pl~~,,,~,‘i~ ?A@ n [[-411(r,,,,i,) < 
T. Thus, since Pl(r,n,,i) ( [[+I],,,,, i) ) = maxe Pl(,,,,.i) (A$ n [[+I] (r ,,, i)), we get that 
Pl ( r,m,i) ( b#41 (r,,,r,iI) < T. We conclude that (I,r,m) b Bi4. 0 ’ ’ 
A.5. Proofs for Section 4.2 
Theorem 32. Let A be a subset of {QUAL, NORM, REF, RANK} and let Z be a 
coherent synchronous system satisfying perfect recall, CONS, and A. Then there is a 
synchronous system 1’ satisfying perfect recall, PRIOR, and A, and a mapping f : 
R H R’ such that for all temporally linear formulas c$ E CKcT, we have (27, r, m) b 4 
if and only if (Z’, f(r) , m) b $. 
Proof. To construct Z’, we use a general technique for taking a “sum” of a sequence 
of plausibility spaces. Let A be an ordinal and let {S, 1 0 < i < A} be a sequence of 
plausibility spaces, where Si = (fiini, Pli) and the 0is are pairwise disjoint. Define @iSi as 
( Ui ai, Pl es, ) , where Pl @s;(A) >Ples,(B) ifeitherPli(Anfii) =Pli(Btlfii) =I for 
all i, or there exists some i such that Pli( A n fii) > Pli( B n fli), Pli(A n Q) >I, and 
Pl,;( A f~ fi.i) = P1.i (B n fl,i) = I for all j < i. We can think of @i& as a lexicographic 
combination of the Sis. 
Lemma A.l. 
(a) @iSi is u plausibility space. 
(b) If 5’i is qualitative for all i, then @iSi is qualitutive. 
(c) If Si is ranked for all i, then @iSi is ranked. 
(d) (&S,) /c is isomorphic to @i( Silt) under the identity mapping. 
(e) ( @iSi) /w, is isomorphic to Sj under the identity mapping. 
(f) IfWl,..., Wk = 8, then @iSi is isomorphic t0 @,>k+l&. 
Proof. We have to show that < is reflexive, transitive, and satisfies Al. It is easy 
to see that, by definition, 6 is reflexive. Next, we consider transitivity. Suppose that 
Plas,(A) > Plesi( B) and Pl,s,(B) > Pl@s,(C). If Pli( B n fli) = li for all i, then 
clearly Pl( CnWi) = li for all i (since Pl as,(B) b Pies,(C)), so Pl,s,(A) 3 Pl,s,(C). 
So suppose that Pl( B n 0,) > li for some i. Let i and j be the smallest indexes such 
that Pli(A n 0;) > li and Plj( B n L?i) > 1.i. It is easy to see that i ,< j, and that 
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Plk( C n ok) = lk for all k f j. If i < j, we conclude that Pli( A n f.2,) 2 Pli(C n 0,) = 
_L;, and thus Pl,s, (A) 2 Pl@s, (C). On the other hand, if i = j, then by definition 
Pli(A f? 0i) 3 Pli(B n ai), and Pli(B flQ) > Pli(C n Q). Since < is transitive in Si, 
we get that Pl;( A n L$) 3 Pli( C n Q). Thus, we conclude that Pl,, (A) >, Pl,s, (C), 
as desired. Finally, we consider Al. Suppose that A C B. Then A f! f& C B n Di for all 
i. Since each S; satisfies Al, we have that Pli(A f’ 0i) 6 Pli(C n 0i) for all i. It easily 
follows that Pl,, (A) < Pl,s, (B). 
Suppose that Si is qualitative for all i. We have to show that @iSi is also qualitative. 
We start by considering A2. Suppose that A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets such 
that Pl,s, (AU B) > Pl,s, (C) and Pies, (AU C) > Pies, (B) . Let i and j be the minimal 
indexes such that Pli( (A U B) f’ Oi) > I, and Pl.;( (A U C) n 0.i) > I/. We claim 
that i = j. Assume, by way of contradiction, that i < j. Then, Pli( (A U C) n 0;) = 1; 
and hence Pli (A n f2i) = Li. Moreover, since Pies, (A U C) > Pl,s, (B), we get that 
Pl;( B n Q) = li. Using A3 in Si, we conclude that Pl,( (A U B) n fli) = -L;, which 
contradicts our assumption that Pli( (AU B) n L?i) > 1-i. Symmetric arguments show that 
we also cannot have j < i. Thus, i = j. By definition Pli( (A U B) n 0;) > Pli( C n a;) 
and Pl;((A U C) n Q) > Pli(B n 0,). Using A2 we conclude that Pli(A n 0,) > 
Pl;( (B UC) n 0,). It is also easy to verify, using A3, that Pl,i( (B U C) f? a,i) = l,i for 
all j < i. Thus, we get that Pies,(A) > Ple,~,( B U C), as desired. Next, consider A3. 
The construction of @Si is such that Pl ~s,(A)=IifandonlyifPli(AnQ)=1_forall 
i. It is easy to see that A3 follows from A3 in each Si. 
Finally, part (c) follows immediately from the definition, part (d) follows imme- 
diately from COND, part (e) is a special case of part (d), and part (f) follows 
immediately from the definition. 0 
Returning to the proof of Theorem 32, first suppose that REF is not in A. Let 
z = (R,97,P ,,... , Pn) be a coherent synchronous system satisfying perfect recall 
and CONS. Roughly speaking, the proof goes as follows. We construct a system Z’ 
which consists of countably many copies of 7%. The runs in R”, the mth copy of 
‘R, are used to simulate the agent’s plausibility assessment at time m. More precisely, 
for all times m, we define a prior on KY”’ that corresponds to the agent’s plausibility 
measure at time m in Z. These priors are then combined using $ to construct the 
agent’s prior in 1’. Since @ orders the priors lexicographically, if m < m’, the pri- 
ors on R”’ dominate those on 77,““. The construction guarantees that at time m, the 
agent considers possible only runs in R”’ U R”‘+ U . . . . Since the prior on R”’ dom- 
inates the rest, the agent’s plausibility measure at time m is similar to that at time m 
in Z. This similarity is what guarantees that conditional formulas are evaluated in the 
same way in Z and Z’. This “peeling away” of copies of R ensures that all tempo- 
rally linear formulas holding in runs in Z are also satisfied in the corresponding runs 
in Z’. 
The formal construction proceeds as follows. Let R 2 72 and 1 E N* (recall that 
IV” = N U {cc}). Define R’ = {t-’ 1 r E R}, where, for each i E {e, 1 . . . , n}, we have 
rf(m) = 
i 
(ri(m),m), if 13 m, 
(ri(Z),m), if 1 <m. 
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LetZ’=(R’,&,Pi ,..., IP:,),whereR’=UrEN* R’, rr’ is defined so that if m < 1 then 
‘rr’( Y’, m) = 7r( r, m) and if m > 1 then rr(r’, m) = n-( r, I), and 7?! is defined by the 
priors described below. 
To define a prior on R’, we first define a plausibility space Pr:,;, on 72”’ for each m E 
Pi, run r E 72, and agent i. We want the time m projection of P;:,,, to be isomorphic to 
pii( r, m) . To achieve this, we define P;l:,i, = (R;:,;, , Plyr,i, ), where 72;‘: i) = R( fic,,,,i, )“I 
and Ply: ;) is defined so that for A C fl,,,,,,i,, we have Pl;: i) ((R(A) p) = Pl(,,,,,i) (A). 
For 1 E N*, we define the prior of agent i at run r’ to be the combination of these priors 
for all time points: ?ir, i) = G3,,P;:,i). 
It is easy to see that ? is synchronous. It is also easy to check that 1’ satisfies perfect 
recall: From the definition, we have that 
IC((r’,m) = 
{ 
{(r”’ ,m) 1 (r’,m) E IC;(r,m), 1’ 3 m}, if 13 m, 
{(r”,m) I (r’,l) E &(r,l)}, if 1 < m. 
Moreover, since Z satisfies perfect recall, we have that R( Ki( r, mf 1) ) (T R( K;( r, m) ). 
We conclude that R’( IC((r’, m + 1)) C R’(Ki( r’, m) ), which is just what we need for 
perfect recall. 
Let 4 E LKC (so that q6 does not include any temporal modalities) and 1 3 m. We 
show that (Z?, r’,m) k c$ if and only if (1, r,m) + qb. As usual we prove this by 
induction on the structure of 4. The only interesting cases are these that directly involve 
modalities. 
We start with the Ki modality. Suppose that (1, r, m) k Ki4. Then for all points 
(s,m) E ICi(r,fn), we have (I,s,m) /= 4. Let (sk,m) E IC:(r’,m). From thedefinition 
of Z’ we get that (s,m) E Ki(r, m) and k > m. Using the induction hypothesis, we 
get that (Z’, sk,m) /= 4. We conclude that (I’, r’,m) /= Ki4. Now suppose that 
(1, r,m) p Ki4. Then there is a point (s, m) E lc,(r, m) such that (1, s, m) b -4. 
Using the induction hypothesis we conclude that (1, s”‘, VI) b -4. Since (s”‘, m) E 
ICi(r’,m), we conclude that (Z’, d,m) k K;+. 
We now turn to the ---+! modality. The definition of PRIOR implies that P:(r’, m) 
is the projection of P;,., i) conditioned on R’( K:( r’, m) ). Now Pi,., i) = @,,! Pl;:.,I,. 
Parts (d) and (f) of Lemma A.1 imply that Pir,,,, ]R~(Q(,.,,,,~)) is’ isomorphic to 
$k~rlr(P:,.;))IR’(~C:(r’,nr)) ). Consider the first term in the “sum”, Pi’L1, ]R,(K~(~J,,~,)). 
Since Z satisfies CONS, we have that 0 (r,,T,,i) C: Ic;(r, m). Thus, conditioning on 
R’(K;(r’,m)) does not remove any runs from R;Z,, = (R(6!(,,,7,,i))“‘. It follows that 
Pr:,;, ]R,(~f(r/,nl)) = P;Li, which i s isomorphic to 7’i (r, m) under the mapping r”” H 
(r’, m). Finally, since eL.j, is the first plausibility space in the “sum”, it determines the 
ordering of all pairs of sets, unless both of them are assigned plausibility I by Ply:,,,. 
Putting all this together, we conclude that if A’, B’ C fli, ,,1 iI and A, B C fif,,,,,i) such 
that (R(A))‘l’ = R’(A’) nR”’ and (R(B))“’ = R’(B’) fI’%C!“, and if Plc,,?,,,,(A) > 1, 
then Pl’(,., n, i)(A’) b Pl;,., ,,,;)(B’) if and only if Pl(,,,z,i)(A) 3 Pl(,,,,,i)(B). 
Assume ‘that (1, r, m) ‘g 4 *i +!I. Thus, we have either Plc,,lfl,i) ( [[$I] (r,nr,i) ) = I or 
Pl( ~,Hz.L) ( [[4 A +I] (r,nl,i) > P~(,JvJ) ( [[4 A 311 (r.,l,,;j 1 . If Pl( r,m,t) ( Ml (r,,r,,i~ ) = -L then 
from the coherence of Z it follows that if A 2 f.i$,/f,i) and R(A) C R( [[$I],,,,, ,) ), 3 , 
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then Pl(,,rr,i,(A) = 1. This implies that P”;,,i,( (‘W[[4]]c,,,,i,)” n R(Q(,,Y,~))“) = 1 9 . 
for al] 1’ >, m. Since ICi(r[,m) contains only points from 72” for 1’ 3 m, we get 
that Pl: # nr i) ( iM11 (r’ 11 i) ) = 1. Thus, we conclude that (Z’, r’,m) k 4 -+; 9 in this 
case. No’w’ suppose that Pl(r,nr,;) ( [[4 A lcl]] (r,,,r,iJ) > Plt,,~) ( [I@ A l$l](r,m,;~ ). If we 
could show that (R( [[4]] (r,,7,,i)) “I = R’( [[c#J]],,,,,,,,~, 1) n ‘I?“, and similarly for $, then 
we could apply the argument of the previous paragraph to show that P1/(r,,n,,iI ([[4 A 
Icr]l(G.~7~,i) ) > p’:rf,n7,i) ( I[$ * 7~ll(r’,nt,i) ’ ) This, in turn, would allow us to conclude that 
(I’, Y’, m) + 4 -+; 9. The fact that (R( [[$J]],,,,,,,,~) )“I = R’( [[4]](,/,,ll,i) 1 n 7~“’ ~‘O~~OWS 
from the following chain of equivalences: 
s”’ E (R( [[@I (r,nl,i) ) ‘I1 
iff (s, m) E [k&,,,,,,i, 
iff (s,m) E fIt,,,,,i) and (x,s,m) I= 4 
iff .+I’ E (R( fl(,,,,,i)) )“’ = R?:,i, 
and (by the induction hypothesis) (Z’, s”‘, m) /= 4 
iff (s”‘, m) E fit,/,,,,;, and (I’, s”‘, m) + 4 
iff (s”‘, m> E [[4J~r~,,7~,i~ 
iff s”’ E R( [[4]] (r’,n,,;) ) n 72”‘. 
Thus, in either case, we conclude that (I’, Y’, m) /= $ +i $, as desired. 
For the converse, suppose that (2, Y, m) F 4+;lj/. Then Pl(r,,,,i) ( [[c#J]],,,,,,~,) > I and 
Pl wf’;z $$ * JAI (r,m,i) ) 3 pl(r,nLi) ( [k#J A +I1 (r,,u,l) ). By the same arguments as above, 
‘l;d,nl,i) ( 114 * @ll(rJ,n,.i) ) > ’ and 
pl{rJ,nt,i) ( 114 * +ll(rf,,n,i) 1 3 pl;r’,n!,i) ( 115, A +ll(d nr i) 1. 1 3 
Thus, (Z’, r’, m) tfI C/I ti I+!I, as desired. 
Finally, for r E R, define f(r) = ?. We have proved that if 4 E ,CKC, then 
(Z, Y, m) + C#J if and only if (I’, f(r), m) + q5. Since this holds for all m, a straight- 
forward argument by induction on structure shows that this holds, not just for formulas 
in CKC, but for all temporally linear formulas. 
We now have to ensure that Z’ satisfies A. Suppose that Z satisfies QUAL. Thus, 
P;( r, m) is qualitative for all agents i, runs r E R, and times m. Using part (b) of 
Lemma A.], we conclude that the prior Pir,,, is qualitative for all agents i and runs 
r E R. This implies, using Proposition 29, that Z’ satisfies QUAL. Similarly, if Z satisfies 
RANK, using part (c) of Lemma A. 1 and Proposition 29, we get that 2’ satisfies RANK. 
Suppose that Z satisfies NORM. Then Pl,,,,,i, ( [he]] > I for all agents i, runs r E R, 
and times m. This implies that ~(true--+&lse) is valid in I. Suppose that I > m. Then 
since T(true --+ifUlSe) E CKC, we conclude from the proof above that (II’, r’, m) k 
-(true --ifalse). Thus, Pl;,,,,,,ij ( [[tmeflcri ,1, IJ , ,. ) > A-. Suppose that 1 < m. By definition, 
we have that R’(K$(ri,m)) = (R(Ki(r,l)))‘. Using part (e) of Lemma A.l, we get 
that P;r,iI]R,(IC;Cr~,nl)) is isomorphic to pjr,i). However, the latter plausibility space is 
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isomorphic to P;( r, 1). Thus, it satisfies T > 1. We conclude that Z’ satisfies NORM, 
as desired. 
Up to now we have assumed that REF is not in A. If REF is in A, then REF does not 
hold for A, although it does hold at many points. To understand the issue, suppose that 
REF holds in Z. Since 1’ satisfies PRIOR, to show that REF holds in Z’, according to 
Proposition 29 it suffices to show that all priors satisfy REF. This is indeed the case if 
1 # cm. For suppose that Y’ E A C 72’. We want to show that Pl,,/,i, (A) > 1. Recall that 
Pir,,;) = @nrP;:,i). From the definition of @, it easily follows that if Pl’,,i, (An 72’) > I, 
then Pl’,,.,,i, (A) > 1. By definition, we have that PI’ (rl,i)(A n R’) = Pl(,/,i)(A’), where 
A’ = {(s, l) 1 s’ E A}. Clearly (r, 1) E A’, since (Y’, m) E A. Since Z satisfies REF, 
we must have that Pl~~,l,i,(A’) > 1. It follows that Pl;, I) I,. satisfies REF if 1 f co. This 
argument breaks down if I = 00. Indeed, it is clear that P;roo,i) does not satisfy REF. 
Since R” is disjoint from R”’ for m < 00, and we only “sum” 7’i’ii, for m < CC to 
obtain P;,._,l,, it follows that R” is disjoint from n;,,,i,, so REF ddes not hold. 
Fortunately, a slight modification of the construction of 1’ can be used to deal with the 
case REF E A. Define Pci, = ( RT,i:,, Ply,,, ), where RT,i, = {F} and Plr,i, ({roe}) > 
1. Modify the construction of 1’ so that the prior of agent i in run Y’ is Pi:, i) = 
“:# I) @ PT,i,. (Thus, P;;, ;) = @m+3q., L). ) It is easy to check that 1’ now does 
satisfy REF. The argument in the case that’1 f 03 remains unchanged. On the other 
hand, if rm E A C R’, it is immediate that Pm (A n RO=) > _L, so we can now deal 
with this case as well. If QUAL, RANK, or NORM is in A, it is easy to see (using the 
same argument as above) that 1’ also satisfies QUAL, RANK, or NORM. 
It remains to show that this modification of the prior does not affect the evaluation of 
formulas. That is, we must show that (Z, r, m) + q!~ if and only if (Z’, Y’, m) k C$ for 
all 1 3 m. Again, we proceed by induction on the structure of formulas. The argument 
for formulas of the form K& goes through unchanged, since the changes to PI’ did not 
affect the K; relations. The argument for formulas of the form 4 +; I,G goes through 
with almost no change. The only case that requires attention is if (1, r, m) k qh +; I,+ 
and Ml1 (r,nr,i) = 1. Our earlier arguments showed that 
Plrl;,, ( (R( WI (r,nr,i))i’ nR(On,,,ll,i,))“‘) = I for all 1’ 3 m, 1’ # 03. 
These arguments go through without change. We must now show that this also holds if 
I’ = 00. But, from the definition of Ploo, we get that PIF,i, ( (R( [4]],, 111 i,)o3 nRoo) = i 
unless Ye E R( [Pllc,,,, i) )“. This implies that (r, m) E [[d]]C,,,,,i, .’ But this cannot 
happen, since Pl(l,nl,i) ( [J]] (r,n,,i)) = _L and Z satisfies REF. 0 
Theorem 34. Let A be u subset of {QUAL, NORM, REF, SDP, UNIF, RANK} and let 
Z be a coherent synchronous system satisfying perfect recall, CONS, PERSIST, and 
,4 Then there is a synchronous system Z’ satisfying perfect recall, PRIOR, and A, 
and a mapping f : R H R’ such that for all temporally linear formulas qb E LKcT, 
(Z, r, m) + 4 if and only if (Z’, f(r), ml k 4. 
Proof. Suppose that Z = (R, r, ‘PI , . . , Pfl) is a coherent synchronous system satisfying 
perfect recall, CONS, PERSIST, and A. If neither CONS nor UNIF are in A, then 
Theorem 32 guarantees that there is a system 1’ that satisfies the stated properties. 
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Suppose that UNIF E A, but SDP, REF $ A. (We sketch the modifications required 
to deal with SDP and REF below.) It does not follow that the system Z’ constructed in 
the proof satisfies UNIF. To see why, suppose r, r’ and m > k are such that (r’, k) E 
aCr,k,;) but (r, m) #i (r’, m). UNIF implies that Pi(r, k) = Pi( r’, k) and (since Z also 
satisfies CONS) that fi(,,,,i, n fi(rf,rn,i) = 0. Hence, our construction guarantees that 
pi,., ij # P[,,i,ij, although r” E O;rk,iI. Thus, the prior in 1’ does not satisfy UNIF. 
It follows that Z’ does not satisfy UNIF either, for ?,! ( rk, k) # P: ( r’k, k), although 
(r”, k) E Oil, k;)’ 
The solution’ to this problem is relatively straightforward. We modify our construction 
so that the prior does indeed satisfy UNIF. In particular, we modify the prior P’ to 
ensure that if Pi(r, k) = P;( r’, k), then P:,, ij = Pi,,, kj. Of course, we have to do so 
carefully, so as to make sure that nothing goes wrong with the rest of the argument in 
Theorem 32. 
We start with a modification of the construction of @ that takes sets (rather than 
sequences) of plausibility spaces and returns a new plausibility space. 
Lemma A.2. Let S be a set of plausibility spaces such that the sets { 0 / ( iIn, Pl) E S} 
are pair-wise disjoint. Then there is a plausibility space @S such that 
(a) ifS= (0,Pl) ES, then @SJ w is isomorphic to S under the identity mapping, 
(b) if S is qualitative for all S E S, then @S is qualitative, 
(c) if S is ranked for all S E S, then @S is ranked. 
Proof. Without loss of generality there is an ordinal ,i and a sequence {Si ) 0 6 i < A} 
such that Si E S for all i, and for all S E S, exists an i such that S = &. I8 Define 
@S = @iSi. Part (a) of Lemma A.1 guarantees that QDS is a plausibility space. Parts 
(a), (b), and (c) follow immediately from parts (e), (b), and (c) of Lemma A.1, 
respectively. q 
Recall that to satisfy UNIF and PRIOR, it suffices to find a partition of R such 
that all the runs in each cell have the same prior. We now examine a possible way of 
partitioning the runs in the system. Let r E R. Define [r, m]i = {(r’, m) ( (r’, m) Ni 
(r, m) , Pi( r’, m) = Pi( r, m)}. Thus, [r, m]i is the set of points in which agent i has the 
same knowledge state and plausibility assessment as at ( r, m). (Note that if fl,,,,,i, # 0, 
then since Z satisfies CONS, Pi( r’, m) = Pi( r, m) implies that (r’, m) pi (r, m) .) 
Lemma A.3. 
(a) For all times m, the collection {R( [r, m] i) 1 r E R} is a partition of 72, 
(b) For all times m and runs r, fi(r,,,,i, C [r, m] i. 
(c) Foralltimesmandrunsr, R([r,m+l]i) ~R([r,m]i). 
(d) For all times m and runs r,r’ such that (r’,O) E [r,O]i, if (r’,m) wi (r,m), 
then (r’,m) E [r,m];. 
Ix If S is uncountable, this construction may require the axiom of choice. There is a variant of the construction 
that does not require the axiom of choice, but the additional complexities involved do not seem worth the 
trouble. 
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Proof. By definition, if (Y’, m) E [r, ml;, then [y’, m] = [r, ml,. Thus, if [Y, rnli # 
[r’, ml;, then [r, ml i n [r’, m] i = 8. Part (a) follows immediately. 
For part (b), suppose that (Y’, m) E flc,,,,,jj. Since Z satisfies CONS, we have that 
(r’, m) -i (r, m). Moreover, since Z satisfies UNIF, we have that Pi( I’, m) = Pj( r, m). 
Thus, (Y’, m) E [r, m] i. We conclude that Q,,.,,,,i, C [r, ml;, as desired. 
For part (c), suppose that (r’,m+ 1) E [r,m+ I],. This implies that (r’,m+ 1) No 
(Y, m + 1) and Pf( r’, m + 1) = Pi( r, m + 1). Since Z satisfies perfect recall, we get 
that ( r’, m) N; (r, m). Moreover, since Z satisfies PERSIST, we get that Pi(r’, m) = 
P;(r,m). We conclude that (r’,m) E [r,m];. Thus, R( [r,m + I];) (I R( [r,m]i), as 
desired. 
Finally, we prove part (d) by induction on m. When m = 0, part (d) obviously 
holds. Suppose that m > 0, (r’,O) E [r,O],, and (r’,m) -i (r,m). Since Z satisfies 
perfect recall, we have that (r’, m - 1) pi (r, m - 1). Using the induction hypothesis, 
we get that (r’,m - 1) E [r,m - 11. This implies that Pi(r’,m - 1) = Pi(r,m - 1). 
Using PERSIST, we conclude that Pi( r’, m) = P;(r, m). Thus, (r’, m) E [r, m]i, as 
desired. 0 
Using both @ and @, we now construct a prior over R’ that satisfies UNIF. For 
r E R, let [ r]i abbreviate R( [r, 0] i). Define P;:,, = @{P;lL, i) 1 r’ E [r];}, where 
P;l:,i, = ( R?:,i,, Pl;:,;,) is the prior defined in the proof of Theore’m 32 that is isomorphic 
to 7’i( r, nz) under the mapping r”” H (r’, m). We must show that PrL,‘! is well defined; 
that is, we must show that if P;l;., ,) # P;i:,,,jj, then R’$, i) is disjoint from RyV,,,i,. 
Note that if (r’, m) E [r”, m]i, then P;:,,,, and PyL,,,;) are identical. Using part (b) 
of Lemma A.3 we get that if (r’,m) $2 [r”,m];, then R;:,,;, fl R;:,,,i, = 0, as desired. 
Thus, P/k,! is indeed well defined. We now define Pi,., ij = @,,,P;~,, as the prior of agent 
i in run r’. 
We claim that this family of priors satisfies UNIF. Notice that 
If r”” E .f$, ,) then, by definition, r’ E L’,,,T,,;,. Using parts (a) and (b) of Lemma A.3, 
we get that ‘r’ E [r] ;. It easily follows that [r’] i = [r];, so indeed the construction 
guarantees that Pi,., iI = P{,,,,7,,l,, as desired. Since the family of priors satisfies UNIF, so 
does 1’. 
Let $ E LKC and 1 3 m. As in the proof of Theorem 32, we now proceed by induction 
on the structure of formulas to show that (Z’, r’, m) k qb if and only if (Z, r, m) k 4. 
The only difference arises in dealing with the -+; modality. 
As before, parts (d) and (f) of Lemma A.1 imply that Pi,.,,ij IR~(c;(,.I,,,~)) is iso- 
morphic to @k.,71( P:r,,l,,,.:,r,,,~t))). Again, we consider the first term in the “sum”, 
qq,IR’(K:(r’,nr)). We want to show that P;l~,,l,fcpcr~,,lljj = P;:,i)I~‘(~:(r’,nl)). Recall 
that p;l:,i,l,,,.:,r’,n,)) is the first term in the analogous “sum” in the proof of Theo- 
rem 32. Thus, even though we are using a different prior from that of the proof of 
Theorem 32, after conditioning, they are essentially the same. By Lemma A.2, we have 
that p;: 1, I y:,,, = P;:,,,. Thus, it suffices to show that lJr,E,r,, R;:,,;, ClR’(ICi(r’,m)) = 
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R;:,,, fl R’( K\( rl, nz) . The inclusion from right to left is immediate. For the opposite in- 
clusion, suppose that s’?’ E UT/E,T,, R;:f,i, n R’(KI( r’,m)). Since Y’ E R’(Kl(r’,m)), 
we must have (r, m) hi (s, m). Since s”’ E Ur,E[r,, R;:.,,i,, there must also be some 
run r’ E [ r-1 i such that s E R;“,,,i). Since s E Z”*( r’, i), we have that (s, m) E fi,,t,,,,,i,. 
By part (b) of Lemma A.3, (s, m) E [r’, m]i. By part (c) of Lemma A.3, we get that 
(s,O) f [r’,O]i. SW mce (r’, 0) f [r, O];, it immediately follows that [Y’, 0] i = [r, 0] i. 
Hence, (s, 0) E [r, 0] ;. Now by part (d) of Lemma A.3, we get that (s, m) c [Y, m]i. 
Thus, Pii( s, m) = pipi( Yq m). Since Z satisfies UNIF and (s, m) E fic,f,,T,,i), it follows that 
p,(s,m) =Pi(r’,m). Hence, (s,m) E fi(r,,,l.l)- Finally, we can conclude that s E R;:,;,, 
as desired. Given this equivalence, we can deal with the --‘i case just as we did in the 
proof of Theorem 32. 
Finally, we need to ensure that 2’ satisfies A The proof of Theorem 32 shows that 
if1 satisfies NORM, then so does 1’. Using parts (b) and (c) of Lemma A.2, it easily 
follows that if Z satisfies QUAL or RANK, then so does Z’. 
If REF and UNIF are both in A (but SDP is not), then we need a further modification 
of the prior, in the same spirit of that in the proof of Theorem 32. Define Pr,, = 
(b”lyJy,;L where Plr, (8) = _L and Plrli( A) = T for all A # 8. We now take the 
prior of the agent to be $, i) = “il, ;) @ “r,i. It is straightforward to show that the 
resulting system satisfies REF and the requirements of the theorem, using essentially the 
same arguments for dealing with REF as in the proof of Theorem 32. 
Finally, suppose SDP E A but REF is not. Note that, since CONS and SDP imply 
UNIF, Z satisfies UNIF, so we can assume without loss of generality that UNIF is also in 
A. To get Z’ to satisfy SDP, we further modify P’ so that it depends only on the agent, 
and not the run. Thus, we define py = @{Pr:.,, 1 r E R}, and define Pi,.,,!, = @,,,Fy’. 
Clearly, with this prior, Z’ satisfies SDP. Again, we need to check that this change in 
prior does not affect the rest of our argument. Once more, the only difficulty comes 
in dealing with the +i case. Just as in the case of UNIF, we proceed by showing 
that ?‘IR~(K;;(~I.~~)) = p~~,i,lR.‘(~l(l!.ll,)). The argument is actually even easier than that 
for UNIF: We show that U,., Ryr,,i, rl R’(K’l(r’,~n)) = R$i, n R’(Ki(r’,m). Again, 
the inclusion from right to left is immediate. For the opposite inclusion, suppose that 
Y’ E ur, R&,;, flR’(Ki(r’,m)). Since s”’ E R’(K{(r’,m)), we must have (r,m) -j 
(s, nz) _ Since s”’ E u,, R;:, iJ, there must also be some run r’ such that s E R;:, ,). 
Thus, (~7 m> E fl(r/,m,i). Since Z satisfies CONS, we have (s, LIZ) N; (Y’, m). It follows 
that (r’,m) -I (r, m). Since Z satisfies SDP, we must have that O(r.l,,.i) = 0,,./ ,,,,, ;), so 
(s, 172) E &,,,,,i). Therefore, s E Ryr.i,, as desired. 
The modifications to deal with the case where both SDP and REF are in A are 
identical to the case with UNIF, and are omitted here. Cl 
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